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In his characteristically lucid exposition of the celebrated general possibility theorem,
Kenneth Arrow observed that “[e]conomic or any other social policy has consequences for
the many and diverse individuals who make up the society or economy. It has been taken
for granted in virtually all economic policy discussions since the time of Adam Smith, if
not before, that alternative policies should be judged on the basis of their consequences
for individuals (Arrow [3, p.124]).” As a matter of fact, the informational parsimony of
traditional normative economics is even more restrictive than consequentialism as such, as
it allows for the description of consequences only in terms of welfares which “the many and
diverse individuals who make up the society or economy” entertain under each and every
consequence.1 It is true that Amartya Sen’s justly famous criticism against the welfaristic
foundations of normative economics, which capitalizes on his impossibility of a Paretian
liberal, brought back the importance of non-welfaristic features of consequences into
proper perspective, yet it still keeps us within the broad boundary of consequentialism.2
¤First published in Social Choice and Welfare, Vol.16, 1999, pp.17-40. This is the written text
of the Plenary Session Lecture delivered at the Third International Meeting of the Society for Social
Choice and Welfare, University of Maastricht, The Netherlands, June 22-25, 1996. I am deeply indebted
to Professors Kenneth Arrow, Charles Blackorby, Peter Hammond, Hajime Hori, Serge Kolm, Eric
Maskin, Herve Moulin, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Amartya Sen for their comments, encouragements and
suggestions over many years on the issues covered by this lecture. Thanks are also due to Professors
Timothy Besley, Birgit Grodal, Kevin Roberts, Maurice Salles, and Paul Samuelson for their comments
and criticisms at various occasions. Last but not least, I am very grateful to St. Antony’s College,
Oxford University and the Centre for Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences, The London School
of Economics and Political Science. The completion of the original paper would have been much delayed
without the warm hospitality of these institutions.
1On the informational parsimony of traditional welfare economics and social choice theory, see Sen
[54; 55; 63] and Suzumura [77].
2The amount of work that followed Sen’s [51; 53] original criticism against welfarism in terms of
the impossibility of a Paretinan liberal is really enormous. See Sen [55; 56; 61; 63] and Suzumura [72,
Chapter 7; 75] for succinct overview and evaluation of this large literature.
1Starkly opposing to the consequentialist approach to normative economics is the pro-
cedural approach vigorously advocated most notably by James Buchanan [10; 11; 12; 13],
Robert Nozick [40] and Robert Sugden [67; 68; 69; 70]. The contrast is really sharp,
as “[Buchanan’s] emphasis on procedural judgements may be taken to suggest ... that
we should abandon altogether consequence-based evaluation of social happenings, opting
instead for a procedural approach. In its pure form, such an approach would look for
‘right’ institutions rather than ‘good’ outcomes and would demand the priority of appro-
priate procedures (including the acceptance of what follows from these procedures) (Sen
[63, p.2]).”3
The purpose of the present chapter is to ﬁll in the gap between these two seemingly
irreconcilable stances by making the following two elementary points. In the ﬁrst place,
we contend that procedural considerations do matter in many important contexts of
real substance, where welfare economics and social choice theory should have much to
say, so that the traditional informational basis of normative economics cannot but be
expanded to accommodate procedural information along with consequential information.
To make this point, we need not look for far-fetched and/or concocted examples. Quite
to the contrary, an embarrassment of riches is a real possibility here, and Sections 3-
5 will be devoted to the three concrete problems that are meant to shed light on the
separate aspects of the same coin. In the second place, there seems to exist a widely
held presumption that procedural considerations can be combined with consequential
considerations by re-characterizing the concept of social states more extensively. This is
demonstrably the case indeed, but the necessary conceptual extension is neither trivial
nor mechanical, and it is worthwhile to work out at least one example to see what is
really involved in this conceptual extension. Section 6 is devoted to this task, focussing
on the classical issue of welfare and rights posed by Sen’s impossibility theorem as the
ﬁeld of our exercise. Section 7 concludes this chapter with a few ﬁnal observations.
Before setting about pursuing the proper tasks of this chapter, a preliminary obser-
vation on the concept of opportunities and procedures might be in order.
2 Opportunities and Procedures
Proper recognition of the importance of procedural considerations along with consequen-
tial considerations, particularly when one is concerned with the issue of individual rights
and freedom, may not infrequently be found in the literature. To cite a salient example, in
his Joseph Schumpeter Lecture on individual freedom and welfare state policy, Assar Lind-
beck aptly observed that “the issue of ‘individual freedom,’ which is closely related not
only to actual achievements but also to the process by which these are realized, is seldom
squarely confronted in economic analysis (Lindbeck [38, p.295]).” However, Lindbeck’s
3See, also, Agnar Sandom’s review article on Buchanan, according to whom “[Buchanan’s] view has
strong implications for the way in which economists conceive of their own role in society. Rather than
attempting to ﬁnd ‘optimal’ solutions to economic problems they should concentrate on ﬁnding good
decision rules, which all individuals and interest groups will ﬁnd it in their own long-run interest to
adopt for the solution of still unidentiﬁed conﬂicts over resource allocation (Sandmo [49, p.52]).”
2emphasis on the process by which consequential outcomes are realized quickly recedes to
the background. Instead of formulating the mechanism or procedure that determines the
process of choice explicitly, his attention becomes focussed on the opportunity set from
which the consequential outcomes are to be chosen. Presumably, this almost impercep-
tible shift of emphasis is motivated by his observation, which is certainly legitimate in
itself, to the eﬀect that “individual freedom has to do with the tightness of various types
of constraints on the decisions and actions of individuals (ibid., p.295),” so that “[s]uch
freedom of choice will be analyzed ... in terms of the opportunity set and/or the potential
options of the individual (ibid., p.297).” Thus, the procedural considerations enter into
Lindbeck’s analytical scenario only through the following two indirect channels: (i) the
opportunity sets diﬀer depending on how the various choice procedures constrain the
decisions and actions of individuals; (ii) “the attitude of the individual to constraints on
his freedom of choice diﬀer depending on who has imposed them (ibid., p.298).”
The advocacy of using the opportunity set to capture the idea of freedom of choice
in general, and the role of procedural considerations in analysing freedom of choice in
particular, ﬁnds additional support in Sen [65, p.202]: “[T]he value of [an opportunity]
set need not invariably be identiﬁed with the value of the best – or the chosen – element
of it. Importance can also be attached to having opportunities that are not taken up.
This is the natural direction to go if the process through which outcomes are generated is
of a signiﬁcance of its own. Indeed, ‘choosing’ itself can be seen as a valuable functioning,
and having an x when there is no alternative may be sensibly distinguished from choosing
x when substantial alternatives exist.”4;5
Instead of subsuming procedural considerations indirectly through opportunity sets
as in the Lindbeck-Sen approach, we adopt in this chapter a direct approach whose
origin can be traced back to Arrow [2, pp.90-91]: “[A]mong the variables which taken
together deﬁne the social state, one is the very process by which the society makes its
choice. This is especially important if the mechanism of choice itself has a value to the
individuals in the society. For example, an individual may have a positive preference
for achieving a given distribution through the free market mechanism over achieving the
same distribution through rationing by the government.”6
We may give analytical substance to Arrow’s insightful observation in the following
way. Instead of sticking to the traditional informational basis of normative economics
4See, also, Sen [57; 58]
5Sen’s [57; 58; 59; 60; 62] due emphasis on the importance of opportunity set led to a huge literature
on the evaluation of freedom in terms of the worth of opportunity sets. See, among many others, Arneson
[1], Basu [6], Bossert et al. [9], Fleurbaey [18], Gravel [22], Klemisch-Ahlert [34], Pattanaik and Xu [46],
Puppe [47] and Sugden [71]. See, also, related earlier studies by Dworkin [16] and Jones and Sugden
[32].
6See, also, Sandmo who wrote as follows: “Judging allocation mechanism either by results or by the
allocation processes themselves may not be a very fruitful contrast. ... One problem with this approach
is that it is not always clear how one should draw the distinction between outcomes and processes,
because the individuals in the economy may have preferences that are partly deﬁned over the processes
themselves. Thus, one may prefer competitive markets to central planning because markets result in
more consumption goods for everybody, but one may also have a preference for having one’s consumption
goods delivered by the market rather than by the central planning bureau (Sandmo [49, p.58]).”
3which focusses on individual preference orderings over the set X of conventionally deﬁned
social alternatives, we use an extended informational basis that consists of individual
preference orderings over the Cartesian product of X and Θ, where Θ denotes the set
of social decision-making mechanisms through which the actual choices are going to
be made. Let Qi denote the extended preference ordering of individual i, and (x;µ1)
and (y;µ2) be two representative elements of X £ Θ. Then (x;µ1)Qi(y;µ2) means that,
according to i’s view, having an outcome x through the mechanism µ1 is at least as good
as having another outcome y through another mechanism µ2.7
People seem prepared to make welfare judgements of this extended type, and it is in
terms of this extended conceptual framework that we are going to incorporate procedural
considerations along with consequential considerations.
3 Discrimination by Procedural Considerations: Prob-
lem of Fair Cake Division
Back, then, to our main scenario. The ﬁrst problem we examine is meant to shed light
on the role procedural considerations may play in complementing purely consequential
considerations when the latter fail to distinguish two situations which are relevantly
diﬀerent from the viewpoint of social welfare.
Example 1: (Suzumura [75, p.31])
A father is to divide a cake among three children fairly. There are two methods to be
examined. Method I is that the father divides this cake into three equal pieces, and tell
the children to take a piece each, or leave it. Method II is that the children are given
the opportunity to discuss how this cake should be divided fairly among them, and cut
it into three pieces in accordance with the conclusion they agree on. If they happen to
conclude that the equal division is the fair outcome, and if we are informed only of the
outcomes, we cannot but conclude that these two methods of division are the same. It is
clear, however, that this is certainly inappropriate. In the case of Method I, children are
not provided with any right to participate in the process through which their distributive
shares are determined, whereas in the case of Method II, they are indeed endowed with
such an important right of participation. k
The gist of this example is that the right to participate is an important procedural
feature which we are unable to capture if our informational basis is narrowly conﬁned
to consequential outcomes and nothing else. To rectify this defect, we must enlarge the
description of social states in such a way that, not only the social outcomes, but also the
procedures or mechanisms through which such outcomes are chosen, are included.
7In what follows, what we call a mechanism is to be interpreted as synonymous with a set of insti-
tutional arrangements which, in its turn, is identiﬁed with a family of game forms. We will explain the
meaning of these cryptic expressions in the speciﬁc context of individual libertarian rights in Section 5,
leaving the general analytical details to Hurwicz [31]. See also Arrow and Hurwicz [4, Part I and Part
IV] and Schotter [50] for related analyses.
4The same point can be made in terms of a more serious-looking example to the
following eﬀect.
Example 2: (Pattanaik and Suzumura [44, p.437])
Consider a society endowed with a ﬁxed bundle of commodities. Suppose that individuals
are entitled to engage in voluntary exchange among themselves, and the outcome in the
core will be socially chosen. We assume that the core is always non-empty and consists
of a single allocation. Suppose that the social decision-making procedure is changed
into the one where the central planning board assigns to each individual a consumption
bundle which he/she would have chosen if the previous procedure were used. As far as
the outcome of social decision-making procedures are concerned, the two situations are
the same, yet the structure of individual freedom and rights are substantially diﬀerent
between the two situations.8 k
Thus, procedural considerations can help us discriminate two situations which can-
not but be identiﬁed if our conceptual framework is narrowly conﬁned to consequential
considerations only.
4 Rectiﬁcation by Procedural Considerations: Wel-
fare and Competition
The second problem we analyse in order to shed further light on the services rendered
by procedural considerations is the classic issue of competition and economic welfare. It
goes without saying that competition is assigned an indispensable role in economics in
general, and in welfare economics in particular. In the absence of market failures, it is
the market-oriented competition which is emphasized as the eﬃcient and decentralized
allocator of scarce resources, whereas in the presence of market failures, it is the contest-
based competition within the public decision-making mechanism to cope with market
failures which receives emphasis as a built-in safeguard against government failures.9
In any case, there is a strong conventional belief in the welfare-enhancing eﬀects of
competition. This widespread belief may be traced back to Adam Smith who wrote in
The Wealth of Nations that “[i]n general, if any branch of trade, or any division of labour,
be advantageous to the public, the freer and more general the competition, it will always
be the more so.” Our ﬁrst order of business is to see if and how this conventional wisdom
can be vindicated.
With this crucial task in mind, we consider an oligopolistic industry producing a
homogeneous product, where n ﬁrms compete in terms of quantities. Let ¼i(qi;Q¡i) be
the proﬁt of ﬁrm i, which is deﬁned by
8See, also, Sen [64, p.14, footnote 20].
9See Suzumura [76] for further details on this dual role of competition in the special context of devel-
oping market economies. See Stiglitz [66] and Vickers [81] for the theory of contest-based competition.
5¼i(qi;Q¡i) := qif(Q)¡c(qi) (i = 1;2;:::;n), (4.1)
where f is the inverse demand function for the product of this industry, qi is the output
of ﬁrm i;Q¡i := Σj6=iqj is the aggregate output of ﬁrms other than i;Q := Q¡i+qi is the
industry output, and c is the cost function that is identical for all ﬁrms.
We assume that:
(A.1): f0(Q) < 0 holds for all Q > 0.
(A.2): c0(q) > 0 and c00(q) > 0 hold for all q > 0.
(A.3): (@2=@qi@qj)¼i(qi;Q¡i) < 0 (i 6= j;i;j = 1;2;:::;n) holds for all (qi;Q¡i) > 0:
Note that these assumptions are not pathological at all. To understand what is involved
in (A.3), which is called the assumption of strategic substitutability, let the reaction
function of ﬁrm i, to be denoted by ri(Q¡i), be deﬁned by
(@=@qi)¼i(ri(Q¡i);Q¡i) = 0: (4.2)
It is easy to check that the reaction function is downward sloping if and only if the
assumption of strategic substitutability is satisﬁed.10
In what follows, we assume that the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists and
is unique for each number of ﬁrms n. Let qN(n) and QN(n) be, respectively, the individual
ﬁrm’s output and the industry output at the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium with
n ﬁrms. To see how qN(n) and QN(n) will be aﬀected by a change in n, we deﬁne the
cumulative reaction function, to be denoted by Ri(Q), by
qi = Ri(Q) if and only if qi = ri(Q¡qi): (4.3)
It is easy to conﬁrm that the cumulative reaction function is downward sloping if and
only if the reaction function is downward sloping. Note also that, by deﬁnition, we have
qN(n) = Ri(QN(n)) for all i = 1;2;:::;n. Adding up these n equations, we may obtain
QN(n) = Σn
i=1Ri(QN(n)), which means that QN(n) is nothing but the ﬁxed point of the
aggregate cumulative reaction function Σn
i=1Ri.
Figure 1 describes the displacement of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium when the num-
ber of ﬁrms increases from n to n + ∆n. As is clearly seen from this ﬁgure, we have
qN(n) > qN(n + ∆n) and QN(n) < QN(n + ∆n). Analytical proof of these properties is
available in Suzumura [74] if necessary.
10This crucial assumption was ﬁrst introduced by Bulow et al. [14] and soon became a standard tool
in the analysis of oligopolistic interactions. See Suzumura [74] for the use of this assumption in various
contexts of oligopoly and economic welfare.
6Turning to the long-run performance of the Cournot market, let ¼N(n) be the proﬁt
earned by each incumbent ﬁrm at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium with n ﬁrms, which is
deﬁned by













Figure 1. Firm entry and displacement of Cournot-Nash equilibrium
If ¼N(n) > (resp. <) 0 holds, potential ﬁrms (resp. incumbent ﬁrms) will be motivated to
enter into (resp. exit from) this industry, so that the long-run Cournot-Nash equilibrium
will be attained when there are ne ﬁrms in the industry, each producing the output
qN(ne), where ne is deﬁned by ¼N(ne) = 0. If this industry is left unregulated, this is the
outcome we should expect to observe in the long-run Cournot market.
To understand the welfare implication of the long-run competition in the Cournot
market, let
V (x;y) = u(x) + y (4.5)
denote the utility function of the representative consumer, where x and y stand, respec-
tively, for the consumption of the good produced by the industry in question and that
7of the numerative good. The budget constraint of the representative consumer is given
by M = px + y, where p is the price of the good produced by this industry, which not
only gives us u0(x) = p as the ﬁrst order condition for utility maximization, but also
allows us to rewrite (4.5) as v(x) := V (x;M ¡px) = u(x)+M ¡px, where M consists of
the external income I and proﬁts generated in this industry Σn
i=1¼i(qi;Q¡i). Evaluating
v(x) at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and neglecting a term which is exogenous in our
present analysis, we obtain the following welfare criterion:
W N(n) := u(QN(n))¡nc(qN(n)): (4.6)
Suppose now that we are in the long-run Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and let there be
a small decrease in the number of ﬁrms for whatever reason. This marginal change in n
will aﬀect the value of our welfare function by
(d=dn)W N(ne) = ¼N(ne)+neff(QN(ne))¡c0(qN(ne))g(d=dn)qN(ne) (4.7)
at the margin. It is clear that the ﬁrst term in the RHS of (4.7) is zero by the deﬁ-
nition of ne, whereas the second term thereof is negative by virtue of (A.1), (A.2) and
(d=dn)qN(n) < 0. Thus, the social welfare measured by (4.6) increases when there is a
marginal decrease in the number of ﬁrms from the long-run equilibrium level ne, which
vindicates that there is a socially excessive ﬁrm entry at the long-run Coutnot-Nash
equilibrium.11
If we are committed to the welfaristic, hence consequentialist, normative framework
pure and simple, this simple result cannot but suggest that the traditional belief in the
role of competition in the market economy must be rejected as a general truth. Should
we acquiesce in a resigned view that “regulation by enlightened, but not omniscient,
regulators could in principle achieve greater eﬃciency than deregulation (Panzar [42,
p.313])?” It is in this context that we should remind ourselves of the role we expect of
competition much more in detail.
There are three instrumental roles of competition which seem to underlie the tradi-
tional belief. First, competition abhors wastes, just as nature abhors a vacuum. If wastes
exist anywhere in the current allocation of scarce resources, an unambiguous signal is sent
that there are unexploited proﬁt opportunities, and unfettered interﬁrm competition will
soon drive them out. Thus, competition plays an instrumental role in promoting an
intrinsic value of economic eﬃciency. Second, competition is a spontaneous mechanism
11This result, which came to be known as the excess entry theorem, was discovered independently by
Mankiw and Whinston [39] and Suzumura and Kiyono [79]. Since then, it has been generalized along
several lines. To cite just a few salient examples, Konishi et al. [35] extended this proposition by allowing
for the general equilibrium interactions through factor markets, whereas Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura
[41] extended the theorem to the three stage game subsuming strategic commitment with R&D in the
second stage of oligopolistic interactions. These and other extensions are systematically expounded in
Suzumura [74].
8through which new innovations are introduced into the market economy. Indeed, ﬁrms
will be motivated to introduce new innovations in order to sharpen their competitive
edge against their rivals, and also to protect themselves from rival’s challenges. In this
sense, competition plays an instrumental role in promoting an intrinsic value of long-run
economic progress. Third, competition is a discovery procedure in the sense of Friedrich
von Hayek [28; 29; 30] through which a decentralized economic system may ﬁnd a way to
make an eﬃcient use of dispersed and privately owned information. Since no agent in the
decentralized economic system owns relevant information for calculating eﬃcient use of
resources at one stroke, it is left to market competition to ﬁnd out who is most capable
of meeting market demand in accordance with proﬁt incentives and price signals. It is
in this sense that competition plays an instrumental role in promoting an intrinsic value
of privacy-respecting decentralized decision-making.
In addition to these instrumental values, competition allegedly has an intrinsic value
of its own. It is the unique mechanism through which each economic agent can try out
his/her own life chance on his/her own initiative and responsibility. It is true that the
mechanism of competition can be very cruel and wasteful in weeding out the winners from
the losers. It is also true that freedom rendered by this mechanism is crucially conditioned
by initial distribution of assets and capabilities. However, these valid reservations do not
change an iota of the fact that competition is a process which provides each agent with
an equal and free opportunity to pursue his/her own aspirations in life. It is this intrinsic
value of competition which the welfaristic concentration on consequential outcomes forces
us to neglect.12
John Harsanyi once made an acute observation on value judgements to the following
eﬀect: “[I]f I approve of using A as a means to achieve some end B, I will do this on
the assumption that A is causally eﬀective in achieving B. Hence, my approval will be
mistaken if this assumption is incorrect. Likewise, if I approve of A as an intrinsically de-
sirable goal, I will do this on the assumption that A has some qualities I ﬁnd intrinsically
attractive. My approval will be mistaken if in fact A does not possess these qualities
(Harsanyi [27, pp.792-793]).” If we assume that A stands for the mechanism of compe-
tition and B for the enhancement of well-being of the individuals, his argument helps
us summarize the gist of our foregoing analysis brieﬂy as follows: If we are committed
to consequential and instrumental approach to the value of competition, we cannot but
disapprove this mechanism generally for its failure to achieve the proposed goal, whereas
if we approve the same mechanism for its intrinsic value in terms of individual freedom,
we are obliged to show that the competitive market mechanism is in fact capable of em-
bodying such a value. It goes without saying that the normative analysis to this eﬀect
requires the expansion of our conceptual framework beyond consequentialism pure and
simple.
12Sen was absolutely right when he wrote that “the economic theory of market allocation has tended
to be ﬁrmly linked with a ‘welfarist’ normative framework. The success and failures of competitive
markets are judged entirely by achievements of individual welfare ..., rather than by accomplishments
in promoting individual freedom (Sen [62, p.519]).” See, also, Lindbeck [38, p.314].
95 Endorsement by Procedural Considerations: Re-
stricted Trade and Welfare
The third context where procedural considerations play an essential role in normative
economics is the bilateral trade restrictions and economic welfare. Among several pos-
sible issues we may select in this broad area, we focus in what follows on the welfare
implications of voluntary export restraints (VERs). VER is a trade-restricting device
which has been introduced at the request of the government of the importing country
and is accepted by the exporting country to forestall other trade restrictions. It is a
highly costly protective measure to the importing country. Indeed, a VER is a variant of
an import quota where license is assigned to foreign exporters rather than to domestic
importers.13 This being the case, a natural question suggests itself: Why should this bi-
lateral agreement be requested by the government of importing country, and why should
it be at all “voluntarily” accepted by exporting country? The answer is intuitively clear,
yet depressing enough.
In the ﬁrst place, by agreeing voluntarily to a VER, the foreign country may secure
that rents will accrue to the exporters rather than remaining in the importing country.
In the second place, domestic producers, who would otherwise have to face challenge by
foreign exporters, are protected by the VER-induced cartel, and can reap extra proﬁts
from the domestic price increase, which foreign exporters can likewise entertain. Thus,
domestic producers as well as foreign exporters may by able to entertain simultaneous
increase in their proﬁts at the sacriﬁce of overwhelming decrease in domestic consumes’
beneﬁt. This is the reason why a VER arrangement, being strongly promoted by domestic
(import-competing) producers, is agreed to in complete neglect of domestic consumers’
concomitant loss.
To show that this intuitive conclusion is indeed inevitable, let us consider a simple
duopoly model where a domestic ﬁrm h and a foreign ﬁrm f supply their products to the
domestic market and compete in terms of prices.14 Let di(ph;pf) be demand function for
the good produced by ﬁrm i (i = h;f). It is assumed that:
(B.1): di is twice continuously diﬀerentiable. The goods produced by ﬁrms h and f are
substitutes with each other, viz. (@=@pi)di(ph;pf) < 0 and (@=@pj)di(ph;pf) > 0(i 6=
j;i;j = h;f) holds for all (ph;pf) > 0.
Let ci(qi) be the cost function of ﬁrm i, which is assumed to satisfy the following:
13Instead of requesting a VER agreement, the importing country could use a tariﬀ or import quota
that would limit imports by the same amount. If these alternative import-restricting measures were
invoked, rents earned by foreign exporters under VER would remain in the importing country either as
tariﬀ revenue or import license fee.
14The following analysis on the welfare eﬀects of a VER agreement is a simpliﬁed version of Suzumura
and Ishikawa [78]. Although we concentrate in the main text on the case of price competition, Suzumura
and Ishikawa [78] have shown that essentially the same result holds true in the case of quantity compe-
tition as well. See, also, Bhagwati [8], Ethier [17], Harris [26] and Krishna [36; 37] for related analyses
of the eﬀects of a VER.
10(B.2): c0
i(qi) > 0 and c00
i(qi) ¸ 0 hold for all qi > 0 (i = h;f).
The proﬁt function of ﬁrm i (i = h;f) is deﬁned to be ¼i(ph;pf) := pidi(ph;pf) ¡
ci(di(ph;pf)), which each ﬁrm i maximizes with respect to its own strategic variable, viz.
price pi. The ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximization is given by:
(@=@pi)¼i(ph;pf) = di(ph;pf) + fpi ¡ c0
i(dh(ph;pf))g(@=@pi)di(ph;pf)
= 0 (i 6= j;i;j = h;f):15 (5.1)
Let fpF
h;pF
f g be the Nash equilibrium in prices, which is deﬁned by the simultaneous
solution for the ﬁrst order conditions (5.1) for i = h and f. This is the free trade price
equilibrium in our two country model. Let us now suppose that a VER is imposed on




so that the feasible price conﬁguration fph;pfg must satisfy the following constraint:
df(ph;pf) = qF
f . Under this VER constraint, we may deﬁne a function ³(ph) by
pf = ³(ph) if and only if df(ph;³(ph)) = qF
f (5.2)
for all ph > 0. The meaning of the function pf = ³(ph) should be clear. Since the VER
cannot be violated once it is agreed to, the foreign ﬁrm cannot but choose pf = ³(ph)
when the domestic ﬁrm chooses ph. In eﬀect, the function pf = ³(ph) describes the way
how the foreign ﬁrm follows the domestic ﬁrm in choosing prices so as not to violate the
VER. It is assumed that:
(B.3): (@=@ph)dh(ph;³(ph)) + ³0(ph)(@=@pf)dh(ph;³(ph)) < 0 holds for all ph > 0.
This assumption requires that an increase in the price of domestic good results in the
decrease in the demand for domestic good even when the price of foreign product under-
goes a concomitant change so as to keep the VER unviolated. Diﬀerentiating ³(ph) and
taking (B.1) into consideration, we can verify that
³0(ph) = ¡(@=@ph)df(ph;³(ph))=(@=@pf)df(ph;³(ph)) > 0 (5.3)
holds.
15Our analysis could be generalized by the introduction of conjectural variations. See Suzumura and
Ishikawa [78].
11If ﬁrm h behaves in full awareness of the VER agreement, the proﬁt function of ﬁrm
h becomes ¼V
h (ph) := ¼h(ph;³(ph)), which is assumed to be a strictly concave function in
ph. If we deﬁne pV
h := arg max ¼V
h (ph), then fpV
h ;³(pV
h )g represents the VER equilibrium
in prices. Since pV
h is characterized by (d=dph)¼h(pV
h ;³(pV
h )) = 0, we may obtain
dh(pV
h ;³(pV










h ))g = 0: (5.4)



















h))) follows from (5.1) for i = h, we can conclude on the basis
of (5.5) that (d=dph)¼h(pF
h;³(pF
h)) > 0, where use is made of (B.1) and (5.3), which
implies in turn that pF
h < pV
h by virtue of the strict concavity of ¼V
h (ph). Since we have
df(pV
h ;³(pV
h )) = df(pF
h;pF
f ) = qF
f by virtue of (5.2), we may obtain
¼f(pF
h;pF
f ) < ¼f(pV
h ;³(pV
h )), (5.6)
where use is also made of (5.3). Therefore, proﬁts of the foreign ﬁrm increase when a
VER is imposed at the free trade equilibrium level of exports. This being the case, we may
assert that, in an international duopoly with product diﬀerentiation, where domestic ﬁrm
and foreign ﬁrm compete in terms of prices, a VER imposed at the free trade equilibrium
level of exports is voluntarily compiled with.16
Turning to the consumer side of the home country, let Vh(qh;qf) = uh(qh;qf) +
Mh ¡ Σi=h;f piqi be the utility function of the domestic representative consumer, where
Mh = Ih+¼h(ph;pf) denotes the income of the representative consumer, and Ih is his ex-
ternal income. By virtue of the ﬁrst order condition for utility maximization, uh satisﬁes
(@=@qi)uh(qh;qf) = pi (i = h;f). Thus, our welfare measure can be speciﬁed by
Wh(dh(ph;pf);df(ph;pf)) := uh(dh(ph;pf);df(ph;pf))
¡pfdf(ph;pf) ¡ ch(dh(ph;pf)). (5.7)
16This part of our result vindicates the conclusion of Harris [26] in a generalized framework.
12It then follows that
(d=dph)Wh(dh(ph;³(ph));df(ph;³(ph)))




where (@=@qh)uh(qh;qf) = ph, (@=@qf)uh(qh(ph;qf)) = ph = ³(ph), and df(ph;³(ph)) = qF
f
are all made use of.
As an auxiliary step in evaluating the eﬀect of a VER on domestic welfare, we need
a simple lemma:
Lemma: Let ½(ph) be deﬁned by ½(ph) := ph ¡ c0
h(dh(ph;³(ph))). If ½(ph) > 0 (t = 1;2)
holds, then ½(µp1
h + (1 ¡ µ)p2
h) > 0 holds for any µ satisfying 0 < µ < 1.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating ½(ph) we may verify that
p0(ph) = 1 ¡ c00
h(dh(ph;³(ph)))f(@=@ph)dh(ph;³(ph))
+³0(ph)(@=@pf)dh(ph;³(ph))g > 0, (5.9)
where use is made of (B.2) and (B.3). Since ½(pt
h) > 0 (t = 1;2) by assumption and ½(ph)
is an increasing function, the assertion of the lemma immediately follows. k
In order to compare the level of domestic welfare at the free trade equilibrium and
that at the VER equilibrium, we now invoke the mean value theorem to assert that there













holds, where ph(µ) := µpF
h +(1¡µ)pV




h) > 0, whereas (5.4) entails ½(pV
h ) > 0. Combining (5.8) for ph = ph(µ) with
(5.10) and invoking Lemma as well as the inequality pV
h > pF
h which we have already










13We have thus established the following remarkable result: In an international duopoly
with product diﬀerentiation, where domestic ﬁrm and foreign ﬁrm compete in terms of
prices, a VER imposed at the free trade equilibrium level of exports cannot but decrease
domestic welfare.17 This result is strongly reminiscent of Vilfredo Pareto’s insightful
observation to the following eﬀect: “A protectionist measure provides large beneﬁts to
a small number of people, and causes a very great number of consumers a slight loss.
This circumstance makes it easier to put a protection measure into practice (Pareto [43,
p.379]).”
In addition to the welfaristic criticism against the bilateral VER arrangements pre-
sented above, there is a non-welfaristic or procedural criticism which also casts a serious
doubt on the legitimacy of bilateral trade restriction as a fair measure for international
conﬂict resolution. More often than not, bilateral agreements are prepared and concluded
in complete neglect of the third parties which have no way of representing themselves
in the procedure through which such agreements are designed and implemented between
the two countries involved, even though the third parties would most likely be aﬀected by
spillover eﬀects of the bilateral agreements thereby concluded. This problem would not
be alleviated even when the nature of bilateral agreements in question were such that the
third parities could equally entertain the beneﬁcial outcomes of bilateral agreements in
full accordance with the most-favoured-nation treatment stipulated in the GATT/WTO
agreements.18 As was aptly observed by Sir Isaiah Berlin, “[t]he desire to be governed by
myself, or at any rate to participate in the process by which my life is to be controlled,
may be as deep a wish as that of a free area for action, and perhaps historically older
(Berlin [7, pp.15-16]).” Recent proliferation of bilateralism is deeply lamentable, as it
tends to deny this innate desire to the third parties which are left outside the bilat-
eral negotiation procedure. The problematic nature of bilateralism becomes even more
lamentable when it is enforced by means of unilateral aggression and/or excessive extra-
territorial application of domestic laws. Needless to say, this concern is also rooted in
the procedural fairness considerations.
We have thus exempliﬁed that there are cases where procedural considerations can add
force to consequential considerations to strengthen the case for or against an economic
or social policy under serious debate.
17A recent study of Kemp et al. [33] examined the conditions under which this result holds in the
presence of general equilibrium interactions.
18Our argument, which emphasizes the procedural fairness of trade dispute settlement mechanism,
is in sharp contrast with Rudiger Dornbusch who put forward a strongly consequentialist argument
in favour of bilateralism to the following eﬀect: “Bilateralism received a bad name when it was an
instrument for restricting trade, but open bilateralism ... can be an eﬀective instrument for securing
more open trade. Indeed, if trade is open in the sense of allowing conditional most-favoured-nation
access, a bilateral initiative can become a vehicle for freer trade on a multilateral basis. Third countries
excluded from an initial agreement should be welcome to enjoy its beneﬁts on condition they adhere to
its terms (Dornbusch [15, p.107]).” See also Garten [21] who likewise tries to justify bilateralism along
the line we are arguing against in the text. Jeﬀrey Garten served as US Under Secretary of Commerce
for International Trade until October 1995.
146 A Taste of Pudding: Welfare, Rights, and Social
Choice Procedure
Enough have been said about the importance of procedural considerations in comple-
menting, rectifying, and endorsing the social welfare judgements based on consequential
considerations. What remains to be done is to exemplify the type of analysis which can
be pursued on the basis of extended conceptual framework introduced in Section 2.
Among many possible directions to explore, we have chosen to focus in what follows
on the issue of logical compatibility between individual libertarian rights and Pareto
eﬃciency, which was originally posed by Sen [51; 52] in terms of his impossibility of a
Paretian liberal. However, unlike Sen who articulated the concept of individual rights
in terms of an individual’s power (local decisiveness) to constrain the social choice rule,
we articulate it as (i) the complete freedom of each individual to choose any admissible
strategy, and (ii) the obligation of each individual not to choose an inadmissible strategy
for him/herself, and not to prevent anyone from choosing his/her admissible strategy. To
be more precise, the concept of individual libertarian rights is articulated in our approach
through a game form which is a speciﬁcation of a set N := f1;2;:::;ng of players, a
set Si of admissible strategies for each player i 2 N, a set A of feasible outcomes, and
an outcome function gA, which maps each strategy proﬁle sN = (s1;s2;:::;sn) 2 £n
i=1Si
into a social outcome gA(sN) 2 A, viz. GA = (N;fSig;A;gA).19
Let us begin with a general remark. In any discussion on individual rights, three
distinct issues should be carefully distinguished and separately addressed. The ﬁrst issue
is the formal structure of rights. As we have already observed, the game form approach
captures the formal structure of rights in terms of a game form GA. Game form being
nothing other than a game prior to the speciﬁcation of players’ preferences over outcomes,
the formal structure of rights in the game form articulation is completely independent of
players’ preferences over outcomes. The second issue is the realization of conferred rights.
The game form approach treats this issue in terms of a game which is deﬁned by a pair
(GA;R) of a game form GA, and a proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) of players’ preference
orderings over social outcomes. The game form approach regards the conferred individual
rights to be fully realized if each and every player can freely exercise his/her admissible
strategy in the actual play of the game (GA;R).20 The third issue is that of the initial
conferment of rights. It is in the context of treating this third issue within the game
form approach that our extended conceptual framework plays an essential role.
To show how this issue can be treated in our framework, let us suppose that the
decision-making mechanism is speciﬁed by the rights-system G which speciﬁes a game
form GA for each set of feasible outcomes A ½ X, viz. G = fGAjA 2 Σg, where Σ is
19This game form approach to individual rights, so-called, originates in Nozick [40] and has been
explored by Sugden [68], Gaertner et al. [20], Pattanaik and Suzumura [44; 45] and Suzumura [73; 75].
20It may well be the case that the game (GA;R) may not have an equilibrium when an equilibrium
concept E is externally speciﬁed. This poses a problem for a theorist who wishes to analyse the inter-
actions among individuals through this equilibrium concept, but the non-existence of equilibrium does
not mean in itself that the realization of individual rights is somehow hindered.
15the family of all feasible sets of outcomes. Let Q = (Q1;Q2;:::;Qn) be the proﬁle of
extended individual preference orderings over the pairs of outcomes and rights-systems,
viz. (x;G1);(y;G2), etc. Recollect that the intended meaning of (x;G1)Qi(y;G2) is that,
according to the judgements of i, it is at least as good having an outcome x through a
rights-system G1 as having an alternative outcome y through an alternative rights-system
G2.
What do we precisely mean when we say “having an outcome x through a rights-
system G”? In particular, how do we formalize the concept of feasibility in our extended
framework? To clarify our meaning, note that a rights-system G and an extended proﬁle
Q induce a restricted proﬁle QG = (Q1G;Q2G;:::;QnG) over the set of conventionally
deﬁned social states by xQiGy holds if and only if (x;G)Qi(y;G) holds for all x;y 2 X
and all i 2 N. Given a game form GA = (N;fSig;A;gA) that articulates the conferred
rights when the feasible set A 2 Σ prevails, we have a game (GA;QG). The play of this
game will determine a set T(GA;QG) of realizable extended social states.21 For the sake of
simplicity in exposition, we assume in what follows that T(GA;QG) consists of a single
outcome, say ¿(GA;QG). In this case, a feasible extended social state is represented
by a pair of outcome and a rights-system (¿(GA;QG);G). We are now in the position
to answer our previous question. Given a physically feasible set of states A 2 Σ and
an extended proﬁle Q, an extended social state (x;G) is feasible in the sense that an
outcome x is actually attainable through a rights-system G, given (A;Q), if and only if
x = ¿(GA;QG) holds true.22
We are now ready to explain how the game form approach treats the issue of initial
conferment of rights. Let Ψ be the extended social welfare function which maps each
proﬁle Q = (Q1;Q2;:::;Qn) of extended individual preference orderings into an extended
social welfare ordering: Q = Ψ(Q). Given a set A 2 Σ of feasible social outcomes, the




holds for any feasible rights-system G.
An example may be of help to make this abstract framework more intuitively under-
standable.23 Consider a speciﬁc situation where N = fC;Dg (C =“consequentialist”;
D =“deontologist”). There are two issues to be decided on. The ﬁrst issue is the choice
of religion, and there are two feasible options: b =“Buddhism” and c =“Christianity”.
21Let CE(GA;QG) be the set of pure strategy equilibria of the game (GA;QG), where E is the relevant
equilibrium concept. If the set gA[CE(GA;QG)] of pure strategy equilibrium outcomes is non-empty,
it is quite natural to assume that T(GA;QG) = gA[CE(GA;QG)]. See Pattanaik and Suzumura [45,
pp.199-200] for the possible deﬁnition of T(GA;QG) when there exists no pure strategy equilibrium of
the game (GA;QG).
22If x 6= ¿(GA;QG) holds, the extended alternative (x;G) is not feasible, given (A;Q). However, it
still makes sense to talk about the preference for or against (x;G1) vis-` a-vis (y;G2) just as we may
meaningfully talk about preferences over the set of consumption plans irrespective of whether they can
be attained under budget constraints.
23The following analysis capitalizes on Suzumura [75, Section 5].
16The second issue is whether or not a given book is to be read, and there are two options:
r =“to read the book” and n =“not to read the book”.
The set A of feasible social outcomes consists of 16 states. A typical element of A is
denoted by (c;n;b;r), which is the state where Mr. C believes in Christianity and does
not read the book, and Mr. D believes in Buddhism and reads the book.
There are two feasible rights-systems: G1 = fG1g and G2 = fG2g. The game form
G1 = (N;fS1
i g;A;g1), where S1
i = fb;cg £ fr;ng for i = C;D and g1(sN) = sN for
all sN = (s1;s2) such that si 2 S1
i for i = C;D, is the one where the two persons are
empowered to choose their religion as well as reading or not reading the book freely.
In contrast, the game form G2 = (N;fS2
i g;A;g2), where S2
i = fr;ng for i = C;D and
g2(sN) = sN for all sN = (s1;s2) such that si 2 S2
i for i = C;D, is the one where the two
persons are only allowed to choose reading or not reading the book freely, the matter of
choosing common religion being decided by the society. If the social choice of common
religion is t 2 fb;cg and the strategy pairs sN = (s1;s2) is chosen, the social state will
be given by (t;s1;t;s2).
Let Q = (QC;QD) be the proﬁle of extended individual preference orderings. We
assume that Mr. C is a die hard consequentialist, who cares only about the outcomes of
social interactions and nothing else. Thus, for all social state x in A;(x;G1)I(QC)(x;G2)
holds true, where I(QC) is the indiﬀerence relation generated by QC. For each pair (u;v),
where u (resp. v) refers to Mr. C’s (resp. Mr. D’s) religion, and for each G = G1 and
G2, let QCG(u;v) be deﬁned by:24
QCG(u;v) : (u;r;v;r);(u;n;v;r);(u;r;v;n);(u;n;v;n), (6.2)
which, in turn, is used to deﬁne QCG that orders 16 alternatives altogether by:
QCG : QCG(b;c);QCG(b;b);QCG(c;b);QCG(c;c). (6.3)
We assume that Mr. D is a deontologist whose belief in the procedural justice in
allowing people to choose their religion has such predominance that, whatever alternatives
x;y 2 A are in fact at stake, he holds that (x;G1)P(QD)(y;G2). For each pair (u;v) of
religions of Mr. C and Mr. D and for each G = G1 and G2, let us deﬁne QDG(u;v) by:
QDG(u;v) : (u;n;v;n);(u;n;v;r);(u;r;v;n);(u;r;v;r), (6.4)
which, in turn, is used to deﬁne QDG by:
QDG : QDG(c;c);QDG(b;c);QDG(c;b);QDG(b;b). (6.5)
Let us examine the game (G1;QG1). It is easy, if tedious, to check that (b;r) is
the dominant strategy for Mr. C, and (c;n) is the dominant strategy for Mr. D. Thus,
(b;r;c;n) in A is the dominant strategy equilibrium of the game (G1;QG1). In the sit-
uation where there exists a dominant strategy equilibrium, it is very natural to assume
24Preference orderings are represented horizontally, with the less preferred alternative to the right of
the more preferred alternative.
17that ¿(G1;QG1) = (b;r;c;n). Turning to the game (G2;QG2), it is again easy to conﬁrm
that r (resp. n) is the dominant strategy for Mr. C (resp. Mr. D) irrespective of whether
the social choice of religion turns out to be b or c. Thus, ¿(G2;QG2) = (b;r;b;n) or
(c;r;c;n) depending on the social choice of b or c. Recollect that Mr. D holds a lexico-
graphic preference for (x;G1) against (y;G2) whatever may be x and y. Thus, he must
surely prefer (¿(G1;QG1);G1) to (¿(G2;QG2);G2). Mr. C being a consequentialist, he
is indiﬀerent between ((b;r;c;n);G1) and ((b;r;c;n);G2) and he prefers ((b;r;c;n);G2)
to ((b;r;b;n);G2) as well as to ((c;r;c;n);G2). By virtue of transitivity of QC, Mr. C
must then prefer (¿(G1;QG1);G1) to (¿(G2;QG2);G2). Thus, as long as the extended
social welfare function Ψ satisﬁes the Pareto principle, G1 must be the rights-system to
be conferred. However, if G1 is conferred and the game (G1;QG1) is played, (b;r;c;n)
will be the social outcome, which is Pareto dominated by another feasible social state
(b;n;c;r).
We have thus exempliﬁed in terms of the issue of initial conferment of game form
rights what kind of analysis can be conducted through our extended conceptual frame-
work which endogenizes procedural considerations along with consequential considera-
tions. In so doing, we have shown that Sen’s Pareto libertarian paradox recurs in the
context of initial conferment of game form rights in the sense that the Pareto principle
imposed on the extended social welfare function, which is invoked in the initial confer-
ment of game form rights, and the Pareto principle imposed on the conventionally deﬁned
social outcomes cannot be satisﬁed simultaneously in general. In this sense, Sen’s origi-
nal criticism against welfaristic foundations of normative economics survives even if his
articulation of libertarian rights in terms of individuals’ local decisiveness is replaced by
the allegedly more proper articulation through game forms. We would like to conclude
this section by repeating our conviction that Sen’s impossibility problem “persists under
virtually every plausible concept of individual rights (Gaertner et al. [20, p.161]).”
7 Concluding Remarks
No attempt will be made to summarize our main arguments presented in this chapter.
Instead, we would like to conclude this chapter with several ﬁnal observations.
In the ﬁrst place, since the choice of a decision-making mechanism or procedure
itself has to be made by a decision-making mechanism or procedure, it may be asserted
that there must be some circularity in our conceptual framework. For example, in the
concrete example through which we exempliﬁed the working of this framework, the rights-
system is chosen through the extended social welfare function which, in itself, is a social
decision-making mechanism. However, this does not cause any serious problem of logical
circularity. To verify this fact, let x1 denote the component of a social state which is not
a decision-making mechanism. Let x2 be the component of a social state which is a social
decision-making mechanism to decide on x1’s. In general, let xt be the component of a
social state which is a social decision-making mechanism to decide on (x1;x2;:::xt¡1).
Suppose that there exists a t¤ and a social decision-making mechanism x¤
t¤ such that there
exists unanimous support for x¤
t¤. In this case, the seeming logical circularity can be safely
18broken, and our exercise is on the ﬁrm logical ground.25 One cannot but recollect in this
context a memorable passage from Jean-Jacques Rousseau to the following eﬀect: “The
law of plurality of votes is itself established by agreement, and supposes unanimity at
least in the beginning.”26
In the second place, the initial conferment of individual rights is determined in the
game form approach by extended individual preference orderings through the extended
social welfare function. A question may be asked if we are indeed prepared to change
the initial conferment of rights, each time people change their mind and express diﬀerent
preferences. Our answer is in the aﬃrmative in a qualiﬁed sense. It would be absurd
if we were to change the social choice of rights-system, each time people changed their
preferences over conventionally deﬁned social outcomes, but it would be likewise absurd
if our social decision-making mechanism were totally insensitive to changes in people’s
preferences over the pairs of outcome and decision-making mechanism. People’s percep-
tion of what should be the conferred rights do change over time, and it would be an
unsatisfactory social decision-making mechanism indeed if it were unable to keep these
changes properly on record.
In the third place, our method of incorporating procedural considerations, which capi-
talizes on an insightful observation due to Arrow, is by no means the only feasible method
to serve for that purpose. To cite just one salient example, Sven Hansson’s [24; 25] recent
attempt to explore social choice theory with procedural preferences is another method
to capture the related, but distinct idea. According to Hansson, “[p]rocedural prefer-
ences are no mere triﬂes in social decisions. To the contrary, they provide mechanisms
for decisional stability in cases when preferences restricted to outcomes do not do this.
Preferences for consensus, or preferences against ties, induce participants to take part
in compromises that would not be motivated by their strictly consequential preferences
(Hansson [24, p.273]).” The gist of our attempt in this chapter is not to advocate any
particular method of analysis, but to call the readers’ attention to the broad class of
procedural issues which awaits our vigorous exploration.27
In the fourth and last place, we would like to keep on record our full agreement
with Sen’s assertion to the following eﬀect: “The contrast between the procedural and
consequential approaches is ... somewhat overdrawn, and it may be possible to combine
them, to a considerable extent, in an adequately rich characterization of states of aﬀairs.
The dichotomy is far from pure, and it is mainly a question of relative concentration
(Sen [63, p.12]).” The purpose of this chapter would be served if we could bring this
simple point home by exemplifying how such “adequately rich characterization of states
of aﬀairs” could be implemented.
25This reasoning is a simple adaptation of Arrow’s argument [2, p.90].
26J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, English translation, New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s
Sons, second edition, revised, 1906, pp.165-166.
27See, also, related earlier work by Friedland and Cimbala [19] as well as Grofman and Uhlaner [23].
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25Chapter 22
Characterizations of Consequentialism and
Non-Consequentialism¤
1 Introduction
It is undeniable that most, if not all, welfare economists are welfaristic in their conviction
in the sense that they regard an economic policy or economic system to be satisfactory if
and only if it is warranted to generate outcomes which score high in the measuring rod of
social welfare1. It is equally undeniable, however, that there do exist people who care not
only about welfaristic features of the consequences, but also about non-welfaristic features
of the consequences, or even non-consequential features of the procedure through which
these consequences are brought about. Even those welfare economists with strong wel-
faristic conviction should be ready to take the judgements of people with non-welfaristic
convictions into account in order not to be paternalistic in their welfare analysis. The
purpose of this chapter is to develop several analytical frameworks which enable us to
examine the choice behaviour of non-welfaristic people. More speciﬁcally, we develop
several frameworks which can accommodate situations where an individual expresses his
preferences of the following type: it is better for me that an outcome x is realized from
the opportunity set A than another outcome y being realized from the opportunity set
B.2 Note, in particular, that he is expressing his intrinsic valuation of the opportunity
¤First published in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.101, 2001, pp.423-436 as a joint paper with Y.
Xu. Thanks are due to an anonymous referee of Journal of Economic Theory whose incisive comments
greatly improved the exposition of the original paper.
1For a general observation on the concept and content of wefarism, see, among others, Sen [10; 11].
2Much attention has been focussed on the opportunity set evaluation, beginning with Sen [12; 13].
See, among many others, Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [2], Pattanaik and Xu [8; 9], Sen [14; 15], and
Suzumura [16]. To the best of our knowledge, Gravel [4; 5] remains the unique precursor in analysing
the extended preference ordering on X £ K, where X is the set of social states and K is the set
of opportunity sets. However, his approach is quite diﬀerent from ours in that he assumes that an
individual has two preference orderings, one for ordering outcomes in X and another for ordering the
choice situations in X £ K. His analysis is focused on the possibility of conﬂict between these two
orderings, and it has nothing to do with the consequentialism and non-consequentialism. Capitalizing
on Arrow’s [1; pp.89-91] insightful observation, Pattanaik and Suzumura [6; 7] and Suzumura [16; 17]
developed a conceptual framework for the analysis of non-consequential features of the decision-making
procedures through which consequential outcomes are brought about.
26for choice if he prefers choosing x from the opportunity A, where x 2 A, rather than
choosing x from the sigleton opportunity set fxg. Using this analytical framework, we
can put forward a concise deﬁnition of consequentialism and non-consequentialism, and
we can also characterize these concepts in terms of a few simple axioms.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic notation
and deﬁnitions. Section 3 discusses the basic axioms which are assumed throughout this
chapter. Some simple implications of these axioms are also identiﬁed in this section. In
Section 4, we deﬁne the concept of an extreme consequentialist and a strong consequen-
tialist, and characterize them axiomatically. We then turn in Section 5 to the concepts
of an extreme non-consequentialist and a strong non-consequentialist and their axiomatic
characterizations. Section 6 concludes this chapter with some remarks.
2 Basic Notations and Deﬁnitions
Let X, where 3 · jXj < 1, be the set of all mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
social states. The elements of X will be denoted by x;y;z;¢¢¢ ; and they are called out-
comes. K denotes the set of all ﬁnite non-empty subsets of X. The elements in K will be
denoted by A;B;C;¢¢¢, and they are called opportunity sets. Let X£K be the Cartesian
product of X and K. Elements of X £ K will be denoted by (x;A);(y;B);(z;C), ¢¢¢,
and they are called extended alternatives. Let Ω := f(x;A)jA 2 K and x 2 Ag. That is,
Ω contains all (x;A) such that A is ﬁnite and x is an element of A. It should be clear
that Ω µ X £ K, and for all (x;A) 2 Ω, x 2 A holds. For all (x;A) 2 Ω, the intended
interpretation is the following: the alternative x is chosen from the opportunity set A.
Let º be a reﬂexive, complete and transitive binary relation over Ω. The asym-
metric and symmetric parts of º will be denoted by Â and », respectively. For any
(x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, (x;A) º (y;B) is interpreted as “choosing x from the opportunity set
A is at least as good as choosing y from the opportunity set B.” Thus, in the extended
framework, it is possible to give an expression to the intrinsic value of the opportunity
set in addition to the instrumental value thereof. Indeed, the decision maker recognizes
the intrinsic value of the opportunity of choice if there exists an extended alternative
(x;A) 2 Ω such that (x;A) Â (x;fxg).
3 Basic Axioms and Their Implication
In this section, we introduce two basic axioms for the ordering º, and examine the
implication of combining them together.
Independence (IND): For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, and all z 2 X n (A [ B), (x;A) º
(y;B) , (x;A [ fzg) º (y;B [ fzg):
Simple Indiﬀerence (SI): For all x 2 X, and all y;z 2 X n fxg, (x;fx;yg) »
(x;fx;zg):
27(IND) corresponds to the standard independence axiom used in the literature (see,
for example, Pattanaik and Xu [8]. Its requirement is simple: for all opportunity sets A
and B, if an alternative z is not in both A and B, then the extended preference ranking
over (x;A[fzg) and (x;B[fzg) corresponds to that over (x;A) and (y;B), independent
of the nature of the added alternative z. (SI) requires that choosing x from “simple”
cases, each involving two alternatives, is regarded as indiﬀerent to each other.
The following result summarizes the implication of the above two axioms.
Theorem 3.1. If º satisﬁes (IND) and (SI), then for all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω, #A =
#B ) (x;A) » (x;B).
Proof. Let º satisfy (IND) and (SI). Let (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω be such that #A = #B.
First, consider the case where A \ B = fxg. Let A = fx;a1;:::;amg and B =
fx;b1;:::;bmg. Since opportunity sets are ﬁnite, m < +1 holds. From (SI), clearly,
(x;fx;aig) » (x;fx;bjg) for all i;j = 1;:::;m. Two simple applications of (IND) lead
us to have (x;fx;a1;a2g) » (x;fx;a1;b1g) and (x;fx;a1;b1g) » (x;fx;b1;b2g). By the
transitivity of º;(x;fx;a1;a2g) » (x;fx;b1;b2g) follows easily. By using an argument
similar to the above, from (IND) and the transitivity of º, we obtain (x;A) » (x;B).
Next, consider the case that A\B = fxg[C, where C is nonempty. From the above,
noting that #(AnB) = #(B nC), we must have (x;(AnC)[fxg) » (x;(B nC)[fxg).
Since opportunity sets are ﬁnite, (x;A) » (x;B) can then be obtained from (IND).
4 Consequentialism
In this section, we deﬁne and characterize two versions of consequentialism: extreme con-
sequentialism and strong consequentialism. First, we deﬁne the extreme consequentialism
and strong consequentialism, respectively, as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.1. º is said to be extremely consequential if, for all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω,
(x;A) » (x;B).
Deﬁnition 4.2. º is said to be strongly consequential if, for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω,
(x;fxg) » (y;fyg) implies [(x;A) º (y;B) , #A ¸ #B], and (x;fxg) Â (y;fyg)
implies (x;A) Â (y;B).
Thus, according to the extreme consequentialism, two choice situations (x;A) and
(y;B) are judged exclusively on their consequences x and y, and the opportunity sets
A and B from which these consequences are chosen are irrelevant. On the other hand,
the strong consequentialism stipulates that opportunity sets do not matter when the
indiviudual has a strict preference over (x;fxg) and (y;fyg). Only when the individual
is indiﬀerent between (x;fxg) and (y;fyg) do opportunities matter.
To characterize the extreme consequentialism and strong consequentialism, the fol-
lowing axioms will prove useful.
28Local Indiﬀerence (LI): For all x 2 X, there exists (x;A) 2 Ωnf(x;fxg)g such that
(x;X) » (x;A).
Local Strict Monotonicity (LSM): For all x 2 X, there exists (x;A) 2 Ωnf(x;fxg)g
such that (x;A) Â (x;fxg).
(LI) is a minimal and local requirement of extreme consequentialism: there exists an
opportunity set A in K, which is distinct from fxg, such that choosing an alternative x
from A is regarded as being indiﬀerent to choosing x from the sigleton set fxg. (LSM)
requires that there exists an opportunity set A such that choosing x from the opportunity
set A is strictly better than choosing x from the singleton opportunity set fxg. In other
words, the individual values opportunities per se at least in this very limited sense.
Theorem 4.1. º satisﬁes (IND), (SI) and (LI) if and only if it is extremely consequential.
Proof. If º is extremely consequential, then it clearly satisﬁes (IND), (SI), and (LI).
Therefore, we have only to prove that, if º satisﬁes (IND), (SI), and (LI), then, for all
(x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω;(x;A) » (x;B) holds.
Let º satisfy (IND), (SI), and (LI). First, note that from Theorem 3.1 we have the
following:
For all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω;#A = #B ) (x;A) » (x;B): (4.1)
Hence, we have only to show that
For all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω;#A > #B ) (x;A) » (x;B): (4.2)
To begin with, we show that:
For all x 2 X and all y 2 X n fxg; (x;fx;yg) » (x;fxg): (4.3)
Let x 2 X. Suppose for some a 2 X n fxg;(x;fx;ag) Â (x;fxg). Given (SI), by the
transitivity of º we have:
For all y 2 X n fxg : (x;fx;yg) Â (x;fxg): (4.4)
Then, by (IND), we obtain:
For all z 2 X n fx;yg : (x;fx;y;zg) Â (x;fx;zg): (4.5)
Using an argument similar to that for (4.4) and (4.5), we can show that:
For all (x;A) 2 Ω and all m = 4;::: : #A = m ) (x;A) Â (x;fxg): (4.6)
Equation (4.6), together with (4.4) and (4.5), is in contradiction with (LI). Therefore,
we cannot have (x;fx;ag) Â (x;fxg) for some a 2 X n fxg. Similarly, if (x;fxg) Â
(x;fx;bg) for some b 2 X, we can show that (x;fxg) Â (x;A) holds for all (x;A) 2 Ω
29with A 6= fxg, another contradiction with (LI). Hence, by the completeness of º, Eq.
(4.3) holds.
From (4.3), noting the ﬁniteness of opportunity sets, and by the repeated use of
(IND), (4.1) and the transitivity of º (4.2) obtains.
Before turning to the full characterization of the strong consequentialism, we note
the following result which will prove useful in establishing the remainder of our results
in this paper.
Lemma 4.1. If º satisﬁes (IND), (SI) and (LSM), then, for all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω,
#A ¸ #B , (x;A) º (x;B).
Proof. Let º satisfy (IND), (SI) and (LSM). Note that, from Theorem 3.1, we have the
following:
For all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω : #A = #B ) (x;A) » (x;B): (4.7)
Therefore, we have only to show that:
For all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω : #A > #B ) (x;A) Â (x;B): (4.8)
We ﬁrst note that, by following an argument simlar to that in the proof of Theorem
4.1, the following can be established.
For all x 2 X; all y 2 X: x 6= y ) (x;fx;yg) Â (x;fxg): (4.9)
Now, from (4.9), by the repeated use of (IND), we can derive the following:
For all (x;A) 2 Ω n f(x;X)g and y 2 X n A : (x;A [ fyg) Â (x;A): (4.10)
Then, given the ﬁniteness of the opportunity sets, note (4.7) and (4.10), (4.8) follows
from the transitivity of º.
To characterize the strong consequentialism, we need an additional condition which
requires that, for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω and all z 2 X, if the indiviudual ranks (x;A)
higher than (y;B); then adding z to B while maintaining y being chosen from B [ fzg
will not aﬀect the individual’s ranking: (x;A) is still ranked higher than (y;B [ fzg).
Formally:
Robustness (ROB): For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω and all z 2 X, if (x;fxg) Â (y;fyg)
and (x;A) Â (y;B), then (x;A) Â (y;B [ fzg).
We are now ready to put forward the following full characterization of strong conse-
quentialism.
Theorem 4.2. º satisﬁes (IND), (SI), (LSM) and (ROB) if and only if it is strongly
consequential.
30Proof. If º is strongly consequential, then it clearly satisﬁes (IND), (SI), (LSM) and
(ROB). Therefore, we have only to prove that if º satisﬁes (IND), (SI), (LSM) and
(ROB), then, for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, (x;fxg) » (y;fyg) implies [(x;A) º (y;B) ,
#A ¸ #B], and (x;fxg) Â (y;fyg) implies (x;A) Â (y;B).
Let º satisfy (IND), (SI), (LSM) and (ROB). Note that, from Lemma 4.1, we have
the following:
For all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω : #A ¸ #B , (x;A) º (x;B): (4.11)
Now, for all x;y 2 X, consider (x;fxg) and (y;fyg). If (x;fxg) » (y;fyg), then,
since X contains at least three alternatives, by (IND), for all z 2 X n fx;yg, we must
have (x;fx;zg) » (y;fy;zg). From (4.11) and by the transitivity of º, we then have
(x;fx;yg) » (y;fx;yg). Then, by (IND), we have (x;fx;y;zg) » (y;fx;y;zg). Since the
opportunity sets are ﬁnite, by repeated application of (4.11), the transitivity of º and
(IND), we obtain
For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω : if (x;fxg) » (y;fyg); then #A ¸ #B , (x;A) º (y;B):
(4.12)
If, on the other hand, (x;fxg) Â (y;fyg), then, for all z 2 X, by (ROB), (x;fxg) Â
(y;fy;zg). Since the opportunity sets are ﬁnite, by repeated use of (ROB), we then have
(x;fxg) Â (y;A) for all (y;A) 2 Ω. Therefore, from (4.11) and the transitivity of º, we
obtain that:
For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω; if (x;fxg) Â (y;fyg); then (x;A) Â (y;B): (4.13)
Equation (4.13), together with (4.11) and (4.12), completes the proof.
In Suzumura and Xu [18], we have exempliﬁed that the axioms (IND), (SI), and (LI)
are independent and also that the axioms (IND), (SI), (LSM), and (ROB) are indepen-
dent. Thus, our characterization theorems, viz., Theorem 4.1 for extreme consequential-
ism and Theorem 4.2 for strong consequentialism, do not contain any redundancy.
5 Non-Consequentialism
In this section, we deﬁne and characterize two versions of non-consequentialism, to be
called the extreme non-consequentialism and strong non-consequentialism, respectively.
Their deﬁnitions are given below.
Deﬁnition 5.1. º is said to be extremely non-consequential if, for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω,
(x;A) º (y;B) , #A ¸ #B.
Deﬁnition 5.2. º is said to be strongly non-consequential if, for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω,
#A > #B ) (x;A) Â (y;B), and #A = #B ) [(x;fxg) º (y;fyg) , (x;A) º (y;B)].
31According to extreme non-consequentialism, consequences do not matter at all, and
what is valued is the richness of opportunity involved in the choice situation. Thus,
two extended alternatives, (x;A) and (y;B), are ranked exclusively according to the
cardinality of A and B and the consequences do not have any inﬂuence at all. In its
complete neglect of consequences, extreme non-consequentialism is indeed extreme, but
it captures the sense in which people may claim: “Give me liberty, or give me death.”
On the other hand, strong non-consequentialism pays attention to consequences if and
only if two opportunity sets contain the same number of alternatives.
To give characterizations of extreme non-consequentialism and strong non-conse-
quentialism, the following axioms will be used.
Indiﬀerence of No-Choice Situations (INS): For all x;y 2 X, (x;fxg) » (y;fyg).
Simple Preference for Opportunities (SPO): For all distinct x;y 2 X, (x;fx;yg)
Â fy;fyg).
(INS) is simple and easy to interpret. It says that in facing two choice situations in
which each outcome is restricted to choices from singleton sets, the individual is indiﬀerent
between them. (INS) thus conveys the message that in these simple cases, the individual
feels that there is no real freedom of choice in each choice situation and is ready to
express his indiﬀerence among these cases regardless of the nature of the outcomes. In
a sense, it is the lack of freedom of choice that “forces” the individual to be indiﬀerent
among these situations. This idea is similar to an axiom proposed by Pattanaik and Xu
[8] for ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice, which stipulates that all
singleton sets oﬀer the same amount of freedom of choice. On the other hand, (SPO)
stipulates that it is always better for the individual to choose an outcome from the set
containing two elements (one of which is the chosen outcome) than to choose an outcome
from the singleton set. (SPO) thus displays the individual’s desire to have some genuine
opportunities of choice.
Theorem 5.1. º satisﬁes (IND), (SI), (LSM) and (INS) if and only if it is extremely
non-consequential.
Proof. If º is extremely non-consequential, then it clearly satisﬁes (IND), (SI), (LSM)
and (INS). Therefore, we have only to prove that, if º satisﬁes (IND), (SI), (LSM) and
(INS), then, for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω;#A ¸ #B , (x;A) º (y;B).
To begin with, from Lemma 4.1, we have the following:
For all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω;(x;A) º (x;B) , #A ¸ #B: (5.1)
Now, for all x;y 2 X, by (INS), (x;fxg) » fy;fyg). For all z 2 X n fx;yg, by (IND),
(x;fx;zg) » (y;fy;zg). It follows from (5.1) that (x;fx;yg) » (y;fx;yg), where use is
made of the transitivity of º. By the repeated use of (5.1), (IND) and the transitivity
of º, and noting that all opportunity sets are ﬁnite, we can show that:
For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω;(x;A) º (y;B) , #A ¸ #B: (5.2)
32Equation (5.2) completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Before presenting the characterization theorem for strong non-consequentialism, we
note the following result which will prove useful in establishing the characterization the-
orem.
Lemma 5.1. If º satisﬁes (IND), (SI) and (SPO), then it also satisﬁes (LSM).
Proof. Let º satisﬁes (IND), (SI) and (SPO). Let x 2 X. For all y 2 X n fxg, by
(SPO), (x;fx;yg) Â (y;fyg). Then, (IND) implies (x;fx;y;zg) Â (y;fy;zg) for all
z 2 X n fx;yg. By (SI), (y;fy;zg) » (y;fx;yg). The transitivity of º now implies
(x;fx;y;zg) Â (y;fx;yg). By (SPO), (y;fx;yg) Â (x;fxg). Then, (x;fx;y;zg) Â
(x;fxg) follows from the transitivity of º. That is, (LSM) holds.
Theorem 5.2. º satisﬁes (IND), (SI) and (SPO) if and only if it is strongly non-
consequential.
Proof. If º is strongly non-consequential, then it clearly satisﬁes (IND), (SI) and (SPO).
Therefore, we have only to prove that, if º clearly satisﬁes (IND), (SI) and (SPO), then,
for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω;#A > #B ) (x;A) Â (y;B) and #A = #B ) [(x;fxg) º
(y;fyg) , (x;A) º (y;B)]:
Conversely, from Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 4.1, we have (5.1). For all distinct x;y 2 X,
by (SPO), (x;fx;yg) Â (y;fyg). Then, from (5.1) and the transitivity of º, for all
z 2 X n fxg, (x;fx;zg) Â (y;fyg). By (IND), from (x;fx;yg) Â (y;fyg), for all
z 2 X nfx;yg, (x;fx;y;zg) Â (y;fy;zg). Noting (5.1) and the transitivity of º, we then
have:
For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω; if #A = #B + 1 and #B · 2;then (x;A) Â (y;B): (5.3)
From (5.3), by the repeated use of (IND), (5.1) and the transitivity of º, coupled
with the ﬁniteness of all opportunity sets, we can obtain the following:
For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω; if #A = #B + 1; then (x;A) Â (y;B): (5.4)
From (5.4), the transitivity of º and (5.1), we have
For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω; if #A > #B; then (x;A) Â (y;B): (5.5)
Consider now (x;fxg) and (y;fyg). If (x;fxg) » fy;fyg), following a similar argu-
ment as in the proof of Theorem 5.1, we can obtain
For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω; if (x;fxg) » (y;fyg) and #A = #B; then (x;A) » (y;B):
(5.6)
If, on the other hand, (x;fxg) Â fy;fyg), we can follow a similar argument as in the
proof of Theorem 4.2 to obtain
For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω; if (x;fxg) Â (y;fyg) and #A = #B; then (x;A) Â (y;B):
(5.7)
33Equation (5.7), together with (5.5) and (5.6), completes the proof.
In Suzumura and Xu [18], we have exempliﬁed that the axioms (IND), (SI), (LSM)
and (INS) are independent and also that the axioms (IND), (SI), and (SPO) are in-
dependent. Thus our characterzation theorems, viz., Theorem 5.1 for extreme non-
consequentialism and Theorem 5.2 for strong non-consequentialism, do not contain any
redundancy.
6 Concluding Remarks
Using the analytical framework of extended preference orderings, where individuals ex-
press preferences over the pairs of outcomes and opportunity sets from which outcomes
are chosen, we developed in this chapter a simple analysis of consequentialism and non-
consequentialism. We have identiﬁed two types of consequentialism, extreme consequen-
tialism and strong consequentialism, and two types of non-consequentialism, extreme
non-consequentialism and strong non-consequentialism. Although these identiﬁed types
are rather extreme, they are meant to illustrate the kind of analysis in which we may talk
about the similarity and dissimilarity of individual attitude toward outcomes and oppor-
tunities. Such an analysis is presented in our companion paper, Suzumura and Xu [19],
where we examined how and to what extent Arrow’s general impossibility theorem hinges
on his basic assumption of welfarist-consequentialism, on the one hand, and whether or
not Arrow’s suggestion that “the possibility of social welfare judgements rests upon a
similarity of attitudes toward social alternative (Arrow [1, p.69])” can be sustained within
the wider conceptual framework than Arrow’s own.
(IND) © (SI)
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© (ROB) = strong consequentialism
© (INS) = extreme non-consequentialism




LSM: Local Strict Monotonicity
ROB: Robustness
INS: Indiﬀerence of No-choice Situations
SPO: Simple Preference for Opportunities
Note: (A) © (B) indicates the logical combination of the two axioms A and B.
Figure 1: Characterization Theorems
34It should be noted that, although individual attitudes toward outcomes and op-
portunities reﬂected in extreme and strong consequentialism, and extreme and strong
non-consequentialism are quite diverse, they all satisfy (IND) and (SI). More remark-
bly, the strong consequentialism, extreme and strong non-consequentialism have more in
common: they all satisfy not only (IND) and (SI), but also (LSM). With our axiomatic
characterizations of the extreme and strong consequentialism, and the extreme and strong
non-consequentialism, we hope that the contrast and similarity of these concepts have
received some clariﬁcations. These characterization theorems are summarized in Figure
1, where (A) © (B) indicates the logical combination of the two axioms A and B.
It is interesting to note that, despite their diverse attitudes toward opportunities
and outcomes, the extreme and strong consequentialism, and the extreme and strong
non-consequentialism all satisfy the following property:
Monotonicity (MON): For all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω, B µ A ) (x;A) º (x;B):
According to (MON), the individual is not averse to richer opportunities; that is, choosing
an outcome x from the opportunity set A is at least as good as choosing the same x from
the opportunity set B which is a subset of A.3 Clearly, (MON) and (LI), and (MON)
and (LSM) are independent.
It is hoped that our attempt in this chapter will be suggestive enough to motivate
further exploration of the analytical framework of extended preference orderings. To
identify some possible directions to be explored, two ﬁnal remarks may be in order.
First, the two basic axioms, viz., (IND) and (SI), which are commonly invoked in
our axiomatic characterzations of consequentialism and non-consequentialism, are not in
fact beyond any dispute. Indeed, it is fairly common that an added alternative may have
“epistemic value” in that it tells us something important about the nature of the choice
situation. Sen [15, p.753] provides us with a telling example: “If invited to tea (t) by an
acquaintance you might accept the invitation rather than going home (O), that is, pick t
from the choice over ft;Og, and yet turn the invitation down if the acquaintance, whom
you do not know very well, oﬀers you a wider menu of having either tea with him or some
heroin and cocain (h); that is, you may pick O, rejecting t, from the larger set ft;h;Og.
The expansion of the menu oﬀered by this acquaintance may tell you something about
the kind of person he is, and this could aﬀect your decision even to have tea with him.”
This means a clear violation of (IND) when A = B. (SI) is also not immune to possible
exceptions. Take, for example, the case where X denotes the set of alternative measures
of transportation for moving from city A to city B. If x and y stand, respectively,
for exactly the same car except for the serial number, you may feel indiﬀerent between
choosing x and y, so that you may feel ﬁne even if you must choose x rather than y from
the opportunity set fx;yg. However, when the choice is between x and z where z is a
comfortable train connecting A and B, you may feel very unhappy if you are forced to
choose x in the presence of z. Thus, you may express a preference for (x;fx;zg) against
(x;fx;yg), which is a clear violation of (SI).
3Note that we are neglecting decision-making cost and other factors which may make a larger oppor-
tunity set a liability rather than a credit. In this context, see Dworkin [3].
35Second, our axiomatizations of consequentialism and non-consequentialism were con-
cerned with rather extreme cases where unequivocal priority is given to consequences
(resp. opportunities) not only in the case of extreme consequentialism (resp. extreme
non-consequentialim) but also in the case of strong consequentialism (resp. strong non-
consequentialism). It goes withoug saying that further research should be pursued so
that active interactions between consequential considerations and procedural consider-
ations are allowed to play an essential role. One possible approach retains the axioms
(IND) and (SI) and invokes the axiom (MON), which we have just observed to be the
common property of extreme consequentialism, strong consequentialism, etreme non-
consequentialism, and strong non-consequentialism. It can be shown that, for ﬁnite X
and K being the set of all nonempty subsets of X, º satisﬁes (IND), (SI), and (MON)
if and only if there exists a function u : X ! R and a function f : R2 ! R such that (a)
for all x;y 2 X;u(x) º u(y) , (x;fxg) º (y;fyg); (b) for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω;(x;A) º
(y;B) , f(u(x);#A) ¸ f(u(y);#B); and (c) f is non-decreasing in each of its argu-
ments. It should be clear that the characterization theorems on consequentialism and
non-consequentialism which are developed in this chapter can be located as special cases
of this general theorem which allows trade-oﬀ between the value of consequences and the
richness of opportunities. However, the full exploration of this general approach must be
left for a future occation.
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In recent years, people have gradually come to realize the importance of non-welfaristic
features of the consequences in forming economic policy recommendations as well as in
performing economic systems analysis. Some salient examples of non-welfaristic features
of the consequences are individual and group rights, procedures through which conse-
quences are realized, and opportunities from which outcomes are chosen.1
In a recent paper, Suzumura and Xu [20] developed several analytical frameworks
which can accommodate situations where an individual expresses his extended prefer-
ences of the following type: it is better for him that an alternative x is brought about
from the opportunity set A rather than another alternative y being brought about from
the opportunity set B. An important feature of these frameworks is the novel concept of
extended alternatives in the form of (x;A) with the intended interpretation of x being real-
ized from the opportunity set A, which is used to evaluate alternative economic policies.
Within these proposed frameworks, they deﬁned various concepts of consequentialism
and non-consequentialism and gave axiomatic characterizations of these concepts. The
various concepts of consequentialism and non-consequentialism deﬁned and character-
ized in Suzumura and Xu [20] are the extreme consequentialism, strong consequentialism,
extreme non-consequentialism and strong non-consequentialism.
However, their axiomatizations of consequentialism and non-consequentialism were
concerned only with rather extreme cases where unequivocal priority was given to con-
sequences (resp. opportunities) not only in the case of extreme consequentialism (resp.
¤First published in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.111, 2003, pp.293-304 as a joint paper with
Y. Xu. We are indebted to the referee of Journal of Economic Theory for several substantial and
expositional improvements.
1There is an extensive literature addressing non-welfaristic features of consequences. See, among
others, Baharad and Nitzan [1], Bossert et al., [3], Dworkin [4], Gravel [5; 6] Pattanaik and Suzumura
[7; 8], Pattanaik and Xu [9; 10; 11], Sen [12; 13; 14; 15; 16; 17], Suzumura [18; 19], and Suzumura and
Xu [20; 21].
39extreme non-consequentialism) but also in the case of strong consequentialism (resp.
strong non-consequentialism). The purpose of this chapter is to pursue a more general
framework so that active interactions between consequential considerations and proce-
dural considerations are allowed to play essential role. In other words, we would like to
develop a framework which allows trade-oﬀ between the value of consequences and the
richness of opportunities.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic no-
tations and deﬁnitions. Section 3 discusses the generalized consequentialism and non-
consequentialism in a simple framework in which the universal set is ﬁnite. In Section
4, we consider the generalized consequentialism and non-consequentialism in a context
in which the universal set is inﬁnite, but opportunity sets are ﬁnite. Section 5 concludes
the chapter with some ﬁnal remarks.
2 Basic Notations and Deﬁnitions
Let Z and R denote the set of all positive integers and the set of all real numbers,
respectively. Let X, where 3 · #X, be the set of all mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive alternatives.2 The elements of X will be denoted by x;y;z;::: : K denotes a
collection of non-empty subsets of X. The elements in K will be denoted by A;B;C;:::;
and they are called opportunity sets. Let X £ K be the Cartesian product of X and
K. Elements of X £ K will be denoted by (x;A);(y;B);(z;C);:::, and they are called
extended alternatives. Let Ω = f(x;A) j A 2 K and x 2 Ag. That is, Ω contains all
(x;A) such that A is an element of K and x is an element of A. It should be clear
that Ω ½ X £ K, and for all (x;A) 2 Ω;x 2 A holds. For all (x;A) 2 Ω, the intended
interpretation is that the alternative x is chosen from the opportunity set A.3
Let º be a reﬂexive, complete and transitive binary relation over Ω, viz., º is an
ordering over Ω. The asymmetric and symmetric parts of º will be denoted by Â and
», respectively. For any (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, (x;A) º (y;B) is interpreted as “choosing x
from A is at least as good as choosing y from B.” Thus, in the extended framework, it
is possible to give an expression to the intrinsic value of opportunity set in addition to
the instrumental value thereof. Indeed, the decision-maker recognizes the intrinsic value
of the opportunity of choice if there exists an extended alternative (x;A) 2 Ω such that
(x;A) Â (x;fxg).
2Throughout this chapter, and for any ﬁnite subset A of the universal set X, #A denotes the cardi-
nality of A.
3Depending on the context, one could also have alternative interpretations of the extended alterna-
tives. For example, in the single agent case, (x;A) could be interpreted as having the alternative x from
the set of alternatives that are produced by the procedure A. We owe this observation to the referee of
Journal of Economic Theory.
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In this section, we conﬁne our attention to the case where #X < 1, and K is the set of
all non-empty subsets of X. We consider the following three axioms on the ordering º,
which are proposed by Suzumura and Xu [20].
Independence (IND): For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, and all z 2 X n (A [ B);(x;A) º
(y;B) , (x;A [ fzg) º (y;B [ fzg).
Simple indiﬀerence (SI): For all x 2 X, and all y;z 2 X n fxg;(x;fx;yg) »
(x;fx;zg).
Simple monotonicity (SM): For all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω, if B ½ A, then (x;A) º
(x;B).
(IND) has a parallel in the literature on ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom
of choice; see, for example, Pattanaik and Xu [9]. It requires that, for all opportunity
sets A and B, if an alternative z is not in both A and B, then the extended preference
ranking over (x;A[fzg) and (y;B [fzg) should correspond to the extended preference
ranking over (x;A) and (y;B), regardless of the nature of the added alternative z. This
axiom has been criticized in the literature. For example, one may argue that freedom of
choice oﬀered by an opportunity set is concerned about how diverse the alternatives are
in the opportunity set. It may be the case that the added alternative z is very similar to
some alternative in A, but quite diﬀerent from all the alternatives in B. In consequence,
the addition of z to A may not change the degree of real freedom of choice already oﬀered
by A, while adding z to B may vastly increase the degree of freedom of choice oﬀered by
B (see Pattanaik and Xu [10] for some formal analysis). If the individual cares about this
aspect of opportunities, the individual may rank (y;B [ fzg) strictly above (x;A [ fzg)
even though the same individual ranks (x;A) and (y;B) equally. (SI) requires that the
individual ranks (x;fx;yg) and (x;fx;zg) equally as long as x and y are distinct, and x
and z are distinct. It is clear that this property is vulnerable to similar criticisms as (IND).
Finally, (SM) is a monotonicity property requiring that choosing an alternative x from
the set A cannot be worse than choosing the same alternative x from the subset B of A. It
essentially reﬂects the conviction that the individual is not averse to richer opportunities.
It may be argued that, in some cases, richer opportunities can be a liability rather than
a virtue; see, for example, Dworkin [4]. In such cases, the individual may prefer choosing
x from a smaller set to choosing the same x from a larger set. Thus, (IND), (SI) and
(SM) are not axioms of uncompromising appeal, but they are not pathological axioms
either. At the very least, they leave us with suﬃcient room for analyzing generalized
consequentialism and non-consequentialism within a simple operational framework.
The following simple implication of (IND), (SI) and (SM) proves useful.
Lemma 3.1. Let º be an ordering over Ω and satisfy (IND), (SI) and (SM). Then, for
all (a;A);(b;B) 2 Ω, and all x 2 X n A;y 2 X n B;(a;A) º (b;B) , (a;A [ fxg) º
(b;B [ fyg).
41Proof. We ﬁrst denote that, by Theorem 3.1 of Suzumura and Xu (2001), the following
is true:
Claim 3.2. For all (a;A);(a;A0) 2 Ω, if #A = #A0, then (a;A) » (a;A0).
Let (a;A);(b;B) 2 Ω, x 2 X n A, y 2 X n B and (a;A) º (b;B). Because º is an
ordering, we have only to show that (a;A) » (b;B) ) (a;A [ fxg) » (b;B [ fyg) and
(a;A) Â (b;B) ) (a;A [ fxg) Â (b;B [ fyg).
First, we show that
(¤) (a;A) » (b;B) ) (a;A [ fxg) » (b;B [ fyg).
Since x 2 X n A and y 2 X n B, it is clear that A 6= X and B 6= X. We consider three
sub-cases: (i) A = fag; (ii) B = fbg; and (iii) #A > 1 and #B > 1.
(i) A = fag: In this case, we distinguish two sub-cases: (i.1) x = 2 B; and (i.2)
x 2 B. Consider (i.1). Since x = 2 B, it follows from (a;fag) » (b;B) and (IND) that
(a;fa;xg) » (b;B[fxg). By Claim 3.2, (b;B[fxg) » (b;B[fyg). Transitivity of » then
implies that (a;fa;xg) » (b;B [ fyg). Consider now (i.2) where x 2 B. To begin with,
consider the sub-case where B[fyg = fa;bg. Given that x 2 XnA and y 2 XnB, we have
x = b and y = a, hence B = fbg. Since #X ¸ 3, there exists c 2 X such that c = 2 fa;bg.
It follows from (a;fag) » (b;fbg) = (b;B) and (IND) that (a;fa;cg) » (b;fb;cg). From
Claim 3.2, (a;fa;bg) » (a;fa;cg), and (b;fb;cg) » (b;fa;bg). Then, transitivity of
» implies (a;fa;bg) » (b;fa;bg); that is, (a;fa;xg) » (b;B [ fyg). Turn now to the
sub-case where B [ fyg 6= fa;bg. If y 6= a, starting with (a;fag) » (b;B), by (IND),
(a;fa;yg) » (b;B[fyg). By Claim 3.2, (a;fa;xg) » (a;fa;yg). Transitivity of » implies
that (a;fa;xg) » (b;B [ fyg). If y = a, given that #X ¸ 3 and B [ fyg 6= fa;bg, there
exists z 2 B such that z = 2 fa;bg. By Claim 3.2, (b;B) » (b;(B [ fyg) n fzg). From
(a;fag) » (b;B), transitivity of » implies (a;fag) » (b;(B[fyg)nfzg). Now, noting that
z 6= a, by (IND), (a;fa;zg) » (b;B[fyg) holds. From Claim 3.2, (a;fa;xg) » (a;fa;zg).
Transitivity of » now implies (a;fa;xg) » (b;B [ fyg).
(ii) B = fbg: This case can be dealt with similarly as case (i).
(iii) #A > 1 and #B > 1: Consider A0;A00 2 K such that fa;bg ½ A00 ½ A0;#A00 =
min f#A;#Bg > 1;#A0 = maxf#A;#Bg > 1. Since A 6= X and B 6= X, the existence
of such A0 and A00 is guaranteed. It should be clear that there exists z 2 X such that
z 2 A0. If #A ¸ #B, consider (a;A0) and (b;A00). From Claim 3.2, (a;A0) » (b;A00)
follows from the construction of A0 and A00, the assumption that (a;A) » (b;B), and
transitivity of ». Note that there exists z 2 XnA0. By (IND), (a;A0[fzg) » (b;A00[fzg).
By virtue of Claim 3.2, noting that #(A [ fxg) = #(A0 [ fzg) and #(B [ fyg) =
#(A00[fzg);(a;A[fxg) » (b;B[fyg) follows easily from transitivity of ». If #A < #B,
consider (a;A00) and (b;A0). Following a similar argument as above, we can show that
(a;A [ fxg) » (b;B [ fyg). Thus, (¤) is proved. The next order of our business is to
show that
(¤¤) (a;A) Â (b;B) ) (a;A [ fxg) Â (b;B [ fyg).
42As in the proof of (¤), we distinguish three cases: (a) A = fag; (b) B = fbg; and (c)
#A > 1 and #B > 1.
(a) A = fag: (a.1) x = 2 B. In this sub-case, from (a;fag) Â (b;B), by (IND), we
obtain (a;fa;xg) Â (b;B[fxg). By Claim 3.2, (b;B[fxg) » (b;B[fyg). Transitivity of
º implies that (a;fa;xg) = (a;A[fxg) Â (b;B [fyg). (a.2) x 2 B. If B [fyg = fa;bg,
then, given that x = 2 A and y = 2 B, we have x = b and y = a. Since #X ¸ 3,
there exists c 2 X such that c = 2 fa;bg. It follows from (a;fag) Â (b;fbg) = (b;B)
and (IND) that (a;fa;cg) Â (b;fb;cg). From Claim 3.2, (a;fa;bg) » (a;fa;cg) and
(b;fb;cg) » (b;fa;bg). Transitivity of º implies (a;fa;bg) Â (b;fa;bg); i.e., (a;fa;xg) =
(a;A[fxg) Â (b;B[fyg). If B[fyg 6= fa;bg, we consider (a.2.i) y 6= a and (a.2.ii) y = a.
Suppose that (a.2.i) y 6= a. From (a;fag) Â (b;B), by (IND), (a;fa;yg) Â (b;B [ fyg).
By Claim 3.2, (a;fa;xg) » (a;fa;yg). Transitivity of º now implies (a;fa;xg) = (a;A[
fxg) Â (b;B[fyg). Suppose next that (a.2.ii) y = a. Since #X ¸ 3 and B[fyg 6= fa;bg,
there exists c 2 B such that c = 2 fa;bg. By Claim 3.2, (b;B) » (b;(B [fyg)nfcg). From
(a;fag) Â (b;B), by transitivity of º, (a;fag) Â (b;(B [ fyg) n fcg). Now, noting that
c 6= a, by (IND), (a;fa;cg) Â (b;B [ fyg). From Claim 3.2, (a;fa;cg) » (a;fa;xg).
Transitivity of º implies (a;fa;xg) = (a;A [ fxg) Â (b;B [ fyg).
(b) B = fbg. If x = 2 B, it follows from (a;A) Â (b;B) and (IND) that (a;A [ fxg) Â
(b;fb;xg). By Claim 3.2, (b;fb;xg) » (b;fb;yg) = (b;B [ fyg). Transitivity of º now
implies (a;A [ fxg) Â (b;fb;yg) = (b;B [ fyg). If x 2 B, then x = b. Consider
ﬁrst the case where y = a. If A = fag, it follows from (a) that (a;fa;xg) = (a;A [
fxg) Â (b;fb;yg) = (b;B [ fyg). Suppose A 6= fag. Given that x = b, y = a, x = 2 A,
and y = 2 B, and noting that #X ¸ 3, there exists c 2 A n fa;bg. From Claim 3.2,
(a;(A [ fxg) n fcg) » (a;A). From transitivity of º and noting that (a;A) Â (b;fbg),
(a;(A [ fxg) n fcg) Â (b;fbg) holds. By (IND), (a;A [ fxg) Â (b;fb;cg). From Claim
3.2, (b;fb;yg) » (b;fb;cg). Therefore, (a;A [ fxg) Â (b;fb;yg) = (b;B [ fyg) follows
easily from transitivity of º. Consider next that y 6= a. If y = 2 A, then, by (IND) and
(a;A) Â (b;fbg), we obtain (a;A [ fyg) Â (b;fb;yg) immediately. By Claim 3.2, (a;A [
fyg) » (a;A[fxg). Transitivity of º implies (a;A[fxg) Â (b;fb;yg) = (b;B [fyg). If
y 2 A, noting that y 6= a, y = 2 B, and x = b, we have #((A [ fxg)nfyg) = #A. By Claim
3.2, (a;A) » (a;(A [ fxg)nfyg). Transitivity of º implies (a;(A[fxg)nfyg) Â (b;fbg).
By (IND), it then follows that (a;A [ fxg) Â (b;fb;yg) = (b;B [ fyg).
(c) #A > 1 and #B > 1. This case is similar to the case (iii) above, and we may
safely omit it.
Thus, (¤¤) is proved. (¤) together with (¤¤) completes the proof of Lemma 3.1.
We are now ready to characterize completely the class of all orderings which satisfy
(IND), (SI) and (SM).
Theorem 3.3. º satisﬁes (IND), (SI) and (SM) if and only if there exist a function
u : X ! R and a function f : R £ Z ! R such that
(3.1) For all x;y 2 X;u(x) ¸ u(y) , (x;fxg) º (y;fyg);
(3.2) For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω;(x;A) º (y;B) , f(u(x);#A) ¸ f(u(y);#B);
43(3.3) f is non-decreasing in each of its arguments and has the following property: For
all integers i;j;k ¸ 1 and all x;y 2 X, if i + k;j + k · #X, then
(3.3.1) f(u(x);i) ¸ f(u(y);j) , f(u(x);i + k) ¸ f(u(y);j + k).
Proof. We ﬁrst show that if º satisﬁes (IND), (SI) and (SM), then there exist a function
f : R £ Z ! R and a function u : X ! R such that (3.1)-(3.3) of Theorem 3.3 hold.4
Let º satisfy (IND), (SI) and (SM). Since º is an ordering, X is ﬁnite and so is Ω as
well, there exist u : X ! R and F : Ω ! R such that
(3.4) For all x;y 2 X, (x;fxg) º (y;fyg) , u(x) ¸ u(y);
(3.5) For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, (x;A) º (y;B) , F(x;A) ¸ F(y;B).
Clearly, (3.1) of Theorem 3.3 is satisﬁed. To show that (3.2) holds, let (x;A);(y;B) 2
Ω be such that u(x) = u(y) and #A = #B. From u(x) = u(y), we must have (x;fxg) »
(y;fyg). Then, if necessary, by the repeated use of Lemma 3.1 and noting that #A = #B,
(x;A) » (y;B) can be easily obtained. Now, deﬁne Σ ½ R£Z as follows: Σ := f(t;i) 2
R £ Z j 9(x;A) 2 Ω : t = u(x) and i = #Ag. Next, deﬁne a binary relation ¸¤ on Σ
as follows: For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, (x;A) º (y;B) , (u(x);#A) ¸¤ (u(y);#B). From
the above discussion and noting that º satisﬁes (SM) and (IND), the binary relation ¸¤
deﬁned on Σ is an ordering, and it has the following properties:
(SM0): For all (t;i);(t;j) 2 Σ, if j ¸ i then (t;j) ¸¤ (t;i);
(IND0): For all (s;i);(t;j) 2 Σ, and all integer k, if i + k · #X and j + k · #X,
then (s;i) ¸¤ (t;j) , (s;i + k) ¸¤ (t;j + k).
Since Σ is ﬁnite and ¸¤ is an ordering on Σ, there exists a function f : R £ Z ! R
such that, for all (s;i);(t;j) 2 Σ, (s;i) ¸¤ (t;j) if and only if f(s;i) ¸ f(t;j). From
the deﬁnition of ¸¤ and Σ, we must have the following: For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω,
(x;A) º (y;B) , (u(x);#A) ¸¤ (u(y);#B) , f(u(x);#A) ¸ f(u(y);#B). To prove
that f is non-decreasing in each of its arguments, we ﬁrst consider the case in which
u(x) ¸ u(y) and #A = #B. Given u(x) ¸ u(y), it follows from the deﬁnition of u
that (x;fxg) º (y;fyg). Noting that #A = #B, by the repeated use of Lemma 3.1, if
necessary, we must have (x;A) º (y;B). Thus, f is non-decreasing in its ﬁrst argument.
To show that f is non-decreasing in its second argument as well, we consider the case in
which u(x) = u(y) and #A ¸ #B. From u(x) = u(y), we must have (x;fxg) » (y;fyg).
Then, from the earlier argument, (x;A0) » (y;B) for some A0 ½ A such that #A0 = #B.
Now, by (SM), (x;A) º (x;A0). Then, (x;A) º (y;B) follows from the transitivity of º.
Therefore, f is non-decreasing in each of its arguments. Finally, (3.3.1) follows clearly
from (IND0).
4According to (3.1), the function u can be construed as a utility function deﬁned on the set of social
states, whereas the function f weighs the value of consequential states, which is measured in terms of
the utility of consequential states, vis-` a-vis the value of richness of opportunities, which is measured in
terms of the cardinality of opportunity sets.
44To check the necessity part of the theorem, suppose u : X ! R and f : R £Z ! R
are such that (3.1)-(3.3) of Theorem 3.3 are satisﬁed.
(SI): For all x 2 X and all y;z 2 X nfxg, we note that #fx;yg = #fx;zg, therefore,
f(u(x);#fx;yg) = f(u(x);#fx;zg), which in turn implies that (x;fx;yg) » (x;fx;zg)
holds.
(SM): For all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω such that B ½ A, f(u(x);#A) ¸ f(u(x);#B) holds,
since f is non-decreasing in each of its arguments and #A ¸ #B. Therefore, (x;A) º
(x;B).
(IND): For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, and all z 2 X n(A[B), it follows from (3.3.1) that
f(u(x);#A) ¸ f(u(y);#B) , F(u(x);#A + 1) ¸ f(u(y);#B + 1)
, f(u(x);#(A [ fzg)) ¸ f(u(y);#(B [ fzg)).
Therefore, (x;A) º (y;B) , (x;A [ fzg) º (y;B [ fzg).
Remark 3.4. Theorem 3.3 allows us to treat all the cases where the utility of consequen-
tial states and the value of richness of opportunities actively interact; it also covers the
polar extreme cases of consequentialism and non-consequentialism deﬁned in Suzumura
and Xu [20]. Indeed, they can be obtained as special cases of Theorem 3.3 as follows:
Extreme consequentialism: For all (x;A) 2 Ω;f(u(x);#A) = u(x):
Strong consequentialism: For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, (x;A) º (y;B) , [u(x) >
u(y) or (u(x) = u(y) and #A ¸ #B)].
Extreme non-consequentialism: For all (x;A) 2 Ω, f(u(x);#A) = #A.
Strong non-consequentialism: For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, (x;A) º (y;B) , [#A >
#B or (#A = #B and u(x) ¸ u(y))].
4 Finite Opportunity Sets in the Inﬁnite Universe
Although Theorem 3.3 provides us with a full characterization result for all orderings
satisfying (IND), (SI) and (SM), it hinges squarely on the restrictive assumption to the
eﬀect that the universal set X is ﬁnite. In many settings, for example, in microeconomics,
the universal set X is often the consumption set which is typically inﬁnite. In this section,
therefore, we discuss the case in which X contains an inﬁnite number of alternatives, but
K consists of the set of all ﬁnite non-empty subsets of X. Consequently, Ω contains all
(x;A) such that A is ﬁnite and x is an element of A.
In this arena, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for an ordering over Ω to satisfy
(IND), (SI) and (SM) can be identiﬁed as follows.
Theorem 4.1. º satisﬁes (IND), (SI) and (SM) if and only if there exists an ordering
º# on X £ Z such that
45(4.1) For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω;(x;A) º (y;B) , (x;#A) º# (y;#B);
(4.2) For all integers i;j;k ¸ 1 and all x;y 2 X, (x;i) º# (y;j) , (x;i+k) º# (y;j+k),
and (x;i + k) º# (x;i).
Proof. First, we note that Claim 3.2 still holds; that is, for all (a;A);(a;B) 2 Ω, if
#A = #B, then (a;A) » (a;B). Next, we show the following:
Claim 4.2. For all x;y 2 X and all (x;A);(y;A) 2 Ω, (x;fxg) º (y;fyg) , (x;A) º
(y;A).
Let x;y 2 X and (x;A);(y;A) 2 Ω. If x = y, then Claim 4.2 follows immediately from
reﬂexivity of º. Let x 6= y. Suppose that (x;fxg) » (y;fyg). Let z 2 X n fx;yg.
By (IND), we have (x;fx;zg) » (y;fy;zg). From Claim 3.2, we must have (x;fx;zg) »
(x;fx;yg) and (y;fy;zg) » (y;fx;yg). Then, by transitivity of », we obatin (x;fx;yg) »
(y;fx;yg). Noting that A is ﬁnite, by the repeated use of (IND), we have (x;A) » (y;A).
Similarly, we can show that if (x;fxg) Â (y;fyg) then (x;A) Â (y;A). Since º is an
ordering, Claim 4.2 is proved.
We now show that, for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, if (x;fxg) » (y;fyg) and #A = #B,
then (x;A) » (y;B). Let C 2 K be such that #C = #A = #B and fx;yg ½ C. From
Claim 4.2, we have (x;C) » (y;C). Note that (x;C) » (x;A) and (y;C) » (y;B) follow
from Claim 3.2. By transitivity of », we have (x;A) » (y;B). Deﬁne a binary relation
º# on X £Z as follows: For all x;y 2 X and all positive integers i;j, (x;i) º# (y;j) ,
[(x;A) º (y;B) for some A;B 2 K such that x 2 A, y 2 B, i = #A, j = #B]. From
the above discussion, º# is well-deﬁned and is an ordering. A similar method of proving
(3.3) can be invoked to prove that (4.2) holds.
Remark 4.3. Based on Theorem 4.1, the concepts of extreme consequentialism, strong
consequentialism, extreme non-consequentialism and strong non-consequentialism de-
ﬁned in Suzumura and Xu [20] can be expressed similarly as in the last section. Details
may be left to the interested readers to spell out.
It should be clear that without imposing any other condition on the extended pref-
erence ordering º, the value of consequential states may not be representable by any
numerical function. In order for the value of consequential states to be numerically rep-
resentable, further restrictions on º must be imposed. Assume therefore that X = Rn
+
in the rest of this section,5 and deﬁne the following property:
Continuity (CON): For all xi 2 X (i = 1;2;::: ) and all x;y 2 X, if limi!1 xi =
x, then [(xi;fxig) º (y;fyg) for i = 1;2;:::] ) (x;fxg) º (y;fyg), and [(y;fyg) º
(xi;fxig) for i = 1;2;:::] ) (y;fyg) º (x;fxg).
Then we may assert the following proposition:
5Rn
+ stands for the non-negative orthant of the Euclidean n-space, where n is a speciﬁed natural
number.
46Theorem 4.4. Suppose that X = Rn
+. Suppose also that º satisﬁes (IND), (SI), (SM)
and (CON). Then there exist a continuous function u : X ! R and an ordering º¤ on
R £ Z such that
(a) For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω;(x;A) º (y;B) , (u(x);#A) º¤ (u(y);#B);
(b) For all x;y 2 X;(x;fxg) º (y;fyg) , u(x) ¸ u(y);
(c) For all integers i;j;k ¸ 1, and all x;y 2 X;(u(x);i) º¤ (u(y);j) , (u(x);i + k) º¤
(u(y);j + k); and (u(x);i + k) º¤ (u(x);i).
Proof. From Theorem 4.1, we know that there exists an ordering º# on X £ Z such
that
(F.1) For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω;(x;A) º (y;B) , (x;#A) º# (y;#B);
(F.2) For all integers i;j;k ¸ 1 and all x;y 2 X, (x;i) º# (y;j) , (x;i+k) º# (y;j+k);
and (x;i + k) º# (x;i).
Now, for all x;y 2 X, deﬁne the binary relation R on X as follows: For all x;y 2
X;xRy , (x;fxg) º (y;fyg). Since º is an ordering and satisﬁes (CON), R on X = Rn
+
is an ordering and satisﬁes the following continuity property: For all x 2 X;fy 2 XjyRxg,
and fy 2 XjxRyg are closed. Therefore, there exists a continuous function u : X ! R
such that for all x;y 2 X;xRy , u(x) ¸ u(y). From the deﬁnition of R, it is clear that
for all x;y 2 X;(x;fxg) º (y;fyg) , u(x) ¸ u(y). Therefore, (b) of Theorem 4.4 holds.
Given that (b) holds, it is straightforward to check that (a) and (c) hold as well.
If we go one step further and strengthen the condition of Continuity in Theorem 4.4
to the following condition, to be called Strong Continuity, the binary relation º will be
numerically representable altogether.
Strong continuity (SCON): For all (x;A) 2 Ω, all y;yi 2 X (i = 1;2;:::) and
all B 2 K [ f;g, if B \ fyig = B \ fyg = ; for all i = 1;2;:::, and limi!1 yi = y,
then [(yi;B [ fyig) º (x;A) for i = 1;2;::: ] ) (y;B [ fyg) º (x;A), and [(x;A) º
(yi;B [ fyig) for i = 1;2;::: ] ) (x;A) º (y;B [ fyg).6
Theorem 4.5. Suppose that X = Rn
+ and that º satisﬁes (IND), (SI), (SM) and
(SCON). Then, there exists a function v : X £ Z ! R, which is continuous in its ﬁrst
argument, such that
(a) For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω;(x;A) º (y;B) , v(x;#A) ¸ v(y;#B),
(b) For all i;j;k 2 Z and all x;y 2 X, v(x;i) ¸ v(y;j) , v(x;i + k) ¸ v(y;j + k) and
v(x;i + k) ¸ v(x;i).
Proof. From Theorem 4.1, we know that there exists an ordering º# on X £ Z such
that
6It is clear that (CON) is a special case of (SCON) where B = ;.
47(G.1) For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω;(x;A) º (y;B) , (x;#A) º# (y;#B);
(G.2) For all integers i;j;k ¸ 1 and all x;y 2 X, (x;i) º# (y;j) , (x;i+k) º# (y;j+k);
and (x;i + k) º# (x;i).
For all (x;i) 2 X £ Z and all j 2 Z , consider the sets:
U(x;i;j) = fy 2 X j (y;j) º
# (x;i)g;L(x;i;j) = fy 2 X j (x;i) º
# (y;j)g:
From (G.1), by (SCON), it is clear that both U(x;i;j) and L(x;i;j) are closed. Note
that X = Rn
+. By Theorem 3 of Blackorby et al. [2], there is a function v : X £Z ! R,
which is continuous in its ﬁrst argument, that represents º#. Therefore, part (a) of
Theorem 4.5 follows. Part (b) of Theorem 4.5 follows from (a), (G.1) and (G.2).
5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has generalized our previous analysis reported in Suzumura and Xu [20]
on extended preferences over consequences of choice and opportunities of choice which
lie behind these consequences. Our previous analysis was the ﬁrst attempt in the lit-
erature to axiomatize the concepts of consequentialism and non-consequentialism, and
it was concerned only with the special situations where no trade-oﬀ relationship ex-
ists between consequential considerations, which reﬂect the decision-maker’s intrinsic
preferences over consequential outcomes, and non-consequential considerations, which
reﬂect his concern over richness of opportunities from which alternatives are chosen.
In this restricted analytical framework, axiomatic characterizations were given to the
concepts of extreme and strong consequentialism, as well as of extreme and strong non-
consequentialism. Going beyond this concern with polar extreme cases of consequen-
tialism and non-consequentialism, we have characterized in this chapter the extended
preferences over consequences and opportunities of choice which embody active interac-
tions between consequential considerations and non-consequential considerations.
The universe of our discourse can be a ﬁnite set or an inﬁnite set, but the family of
opportunity sets is restricted to consist solely of ﬁnite sets. This analytical framework
can be useful in generalizing some classical analyses of individual and social choices,
where there is a pervasive, yet implicit, assumption to the eﬀect that all individuals
as well as society are concerned only with consequences of their choices. As a matter
of fact, the traditional analysis is even more restrictive than consequentialism as such,
since all individuals as well as society are implicitly assumed to evaluate consequences
only through their eﬀects on individual or social welfare. The eﬀects of the existence of
non-consequentialists in the society on the Arrovian impossibility theorem are examined
in Suzumura and Xu [21] on the basis of Suzumura and Xu [20], and it is an interesting
exercise to see what diﬀerence, if any, will the existence of active interactions between
consequential considerations and non-consequential considerations exert on the results
obtained in Suzumura and Xu [21]. It is also interesting to examine how the traditional
theory of consumer’s behavior and general equilibrium analysis will have to be modiﬁed
48in the presence of non-consequential considerations. To conduct this latter analysis,
however, we must go beyond our current analytical framework which restricts the family
of opportunity sets to consist of ﬁnite sets. This task must be left for our future research.
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51Chapter 24
Welfarist-Consequentialism, Similarity of
Attitudes, and Arrow’s General
Impossibility Theorem¤
1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to re-examine Arrow’s general impossibility theorem with
special reference to the following two basic features of his celebrated Social Choice and
Individual Values. The ﬁrst feature is the welfarist-consequentialism, which claims that
the social judgements on right or wrong actions should be based on the assessment of
their consequential states of aﬀairs, where the assessment of consequences is conducted
exclusively in terms of people’s welfare, their preference satisfaction, or people getting
what they want.1; 2 Not only is Arrow’s own analysis based squarely on the welfarist-
consequentialism in this sense, but also this basic feature permeates through the entire
¤First published in Social Choice and Welfare, Vol.22, 2004, pp.237-251 as a joint paper with Y.
Xu. We are grateful to Professors Kenneth J. Arrow, Peter J. Hammond, Serge Kolm, Prasanta K.
Pattanaik, and Amartya K. Sen for their helpful conversations and suggestions over many years on this
and related issues. Thanks are also due to the anonymous referee of Social Choice and Welfare whose
incisive comments helped us to improve our exposition, and to Yukinori Iwata, Toyotaka Sakai and
Masaki Shimoji for pointing out a logical ﬂaw in an earlier draft of the chapter. To cope with this
logical ﬂaw, a modiﬁed version of independence condition, which was suggested to us by Toyotaka Sakai,
was invoked in preparing this chapter. Needless to say, we are solely responsible for any errors and
opaqueness which may still remain in this chapter.
1See Sen [16; 17; 19], and Sen and Williams [22] for more detailed account of welfarist-consequentialism
and criticisms thereof. See also Arrow [2], Hammond [8], and Suzumura [25; 26; 27].
2Welfarist-consequentialism has been under intensive scrutiny and harsh criticism in recent years by,
e.g., Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [4], Pattanaik and Xu [11; 12], Sen [18; 19; 20], and Suzumura [25; 26;
27]. It is often argued that individuals are ready to express preferences not only over outcomes, but
also over opportunity sets from which outcomes are chosen. It is not infrequently suggested that such
an extended preference should be duly taken into consideration in the analysis of how socially right
or wrong actions should be determined. However, most of the preceding attempts to respond to these
arguments and suggestions are concerned with the ranking of opportunity sets in terms of the freedom
of choice and/or overall well-being of individuals. To the best of our knowledge, the question as to how
individuals’ extended preference orderings over outcomes and opportunities should be aggregated into
the social preference ordering has been left unexplored in this literature.
52ediﬁce of contemporary social choice theory.3 The second feature is the perception that
“the possibility of social welfare judgements rests upon a similarity of attitudes toward
social alternatives (Arrow [1, p.69]).” To substantiate this claim analytically, Arrow [1,
p.81] showed that “it is possible to construct suitable social welfare functions if we feel
entitled to say in advance that the tastes of individuals fall within certain prescribed
realms of similarity.” It goes without saying that a large portion of the subsequent de-
velopments in social choice theory is devoted to the exploration of Arrow’s important
insight to this eﬀect.4
To gauge the extent to which Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the resolution thereof
hinge on these two basic features of his framework, this chapter develops two extended
frameworks in which individuals are supposed to express their preferences not only about
consequential outcomes, but also about opportunity sets from which outcomes are cho-
sen. Two such frameworks are identiﬁed below: a consequentialist framework and a
non-consequentialist framework. It is shown that the counterpart of Arrow’s impossi-
bility theorem still holds in the consequentialist framework if the society is composed
exclusively of individuals who show similar attitudes toward social alternatives, whereas
a resolution of Arrow’s impossibility theorem can be found if there is a diversity of at-
titudes among individuals. Thus, in the consequentialist conceptual framework, it is in
fact a dissimilarity rather than a similarity among individuals that serves as a deux ex
machina vis-` a-vis Arrow’s general impossibility theorem. In contrast with this verdict on
the consequentialist framework, an interesting resolution of Arrow’s general impossibility
theorem exists in the non-consequentialist framework, which may work even in the ho-
mogeneous society where all individuals exhibit a similarity of attitudes toward outcomes
and opportunities.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we lay the foundation of
our analysis by introducing some basic notation and deﬁnitions. Section 3 is devoted to
examining how Arrow’s general impossibility theorem fares in the consequentialist frame-
work, whereas Section 4 conducts the corresponding analysis in the non-consequentialist
framework. Section 5 describes the way how these results can be generalized, and Section
6 concludes this chapter with several observations.
2 Basic Notation and Deﬁnitions
Let X be the set of all conventionally deﬁned social states, which are mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive. It is assumed that X satisﬁes 3 · #X < 1. The elements
of X are denoted by x;y;z, ¢¢¢, and they are called outcomes. K denotes the set of
all non-empty subsets of X. The elements of K are denoted by A;B;C, ¢¢¢, and they
are called opportunity sets. Let X £ K be the Cartesian product of X and K. The
3It is true that Sen’s [14, Chapter 6¤; 15; 16; 17; 19] well-known criticism against the welfaristic
foundations of normative economics and social choice theory, which capitalizes on his impossibility of a
Paretian liberal, sharply brought the importance of non-welfaristic features of consequences to the fore.
However, it still keeps us within the broad territory of consequentialism. See, also, Suzumura [23; 25].
4See, among others, Black [3], Kuga and Nagatani [10], and Sen [14, Chapter 10¤].
53elements of X £K are denoted by (x;A);(y;B);(z;C), ¢¢¢, and they are called extended
alternatives. The intended meaning of (x;A) 2 X £ K is that the outcome x is chosen
from the opportunity set A, but this interpretation will be vacuous if x 62 A. Thus, let
Ω µ X £ K be such that x 2 A whenever (x;A) 2 Ω.
Let N = f1;2;¢¢¢ ;ng be the set of all individuals in the society, where 2 · n = #N <
1. Each individual i 2 N is assumed to have an extended preference ordering Ri over
Ω, which is reﬂexive, complete and transitive. For any (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω;(x;A)Ri(y;B)
is meant to imply that i feels at least as good when choosing x from A as when choosing
y from B. The asymmetric part and the symmetric part of Ri are denoted by P(Ri)
and I(Ri), respectively, which denote the strict preference relation and the indiﬀerence
relation of i 2 N.
Let } be the set of all logically possible orderings over Ω. Then a proﬁle R =
(R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;Rn) of extended individual preference orderings, one extended ordering for
each individual, is an element of }n. An extended social welfare function (ESWF) is a
function f which maps each and every proﬁle in some subset Df of }n into }. When
R = f(R) holds for some R 2 Df, I(R) and P(R) stand, respectively, for the social
indiﬀerence relation and the social strict preference relation corresponding to R. Given
an ESWF f, the problem of social choice we envisage in this chapter can be phrased as
follows. Suppose that a proﬁle R 2 Df and a set S µ X of feasible social alternatives
are given. Then the best social choice from S can be identiﬁed to be an x¤ 2 S such that
(x¤;S)R(x;S) holds for all x 2 S, where R = f(R). To make this interpretation natural
as well as sensible, we assume that each and every x 2 X denotes a public alternative such
as a list of public goods to be provided in the society, or the description of a candidate
in the public election.
2.1 Domain Restriction
In order to make our problem both analytically tractable and interesting, we assume that
each individual’s extended preference ordering Ri (i 2 N), which deﬁnes an admissible
proﬁle R = (R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;Rn) 2 Df; satisﬁes the following two conditions:
Independence (IND): For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω and all z 2 X n (A [ B),
(x;A)Ri(y;B) , (x;A [ fzg)Ri(y;B [ fzg):
Simple Indiﬀerence (SI): For all x 2 X and all y;z 2 X n fxg,
(x;fx;yg)I(Ri)(x;fx;zg):
(IND) corresponds to the standard independence axiom used in the literature (see,
for example, Pattanaik and Xu [11]). It requires that, for all opportunity sets A;B 2 K, if
an alternative z 2 X is not in both A and B, then the preference ranking over (x;A[fzg)
and (y;B [ fzg) corresponds to the preference ranking over (x;A) and (y;B). (SI)
requires that choosing x from the two simple cases consisting of two alternatives each is
regarded as indiﬀerent no matter what alternative is added to x.
We may as well assume the following condition:
54Monotonicity (MON): For all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω,
B µ A ) (x;A)Ri(x;B):
(MON) makes an explicit use of information about the opportunity aspect of choice
situations. It requires that choosing an outcome x from the opportunity set A is at least
as good as choosing the same x from the opportunity set B which is a subset of A. In
the present context, this axiom seems very reasonable.
The following result summarizes the implication of the above three conditions.
Lemma 1. If Ri satisﬁes (IND), (SI) and (MON), then for all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω,
#A ¸ #B ) (x;A)Ri(x;B).
Proof. Let Ri satisfy (IND), (SI), and (MON). Let (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω be such that
#A ¸ #B.
If #A = #B = 1, then A = B = fxg. By reﬂexivity of Ri, it follows immediately
that (x;A)I(Ri)(x;B). If #A = #B = 2, then by (SI), (x;A)I(Ri)(x;B) follows from
(SI) directly. Thus, we have proved the following:
For all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω; if #A = #B · 2; then (x;A)I(Ri)(x;B): (2.1)
To prove that #A = #B = m > 2 ) (x;A)I(Ri)(x;B), we use the induction
method. Suppose
For all (x;S);(x;T) 2 Ω such that #S = #T < m;(x;S)I(Ri)(x;T): (2.2)
If there exists y 2 A\B such that y 6= x, then, from (2.2), (x;Anfyg)I(Ri)(x;B nfyg).
By (IND), (x;A)I(Ri)(x;B) follows immediately. If A \ B = fxg, then consider
C = (A n fag) [ fbg where a 2 A n fxg and b 2 B n fxg. From the previous argu-
ment, clearly, (x;A)I(Ri)(x;C) and (x;B)I(Ri)(x;C). Thus, by the transitivity of Ri,
(x;A)I(Ri)(x;B).
From (2.1) and (2.2), noting the ﬁniteness of X, we have
For all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω; if #A = #B; then(x;A)I(Ri)(x;B): (2.3)
Consider now that #A > #B. If #B = 1, that is, B = fxg, by (MON),
(x;A)Ri(x;B) follows immediately. Similarly, if A = X, then, by (MON), (x;A) =
(x;X)Ri(x;B). Let #X > #A > #B > 1. Clearly, in this case, there exists C 2 K such
that #(B[C) = #A. From (2.3), (x;C[B)I(Ri)(x;A). By (MON), (x;C[B)Ri(x;B).
Hence, (x;A)Ri(x;B) follows from the transitivity of Ri immediately.
Thus, these simple conditions impose a mild restriction on each individual’s extended
preference ordering to the eﬀect that each individual is not averse to richer opportunities,
55viz., a larger opportunity set does not do any harm to him.5; 6
Throughout Sections 3 and 4, we assume that each and every proﬁle R = (R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;
Rn) 2 Df is such that Ri satisﬁes the conditions (IND), (SI) and (MON) for all i 2 N.
2.2 Arrovian Conditions in the Extended Framework
In addition to the domain restriction on Df introduced above, we introduce several
conditions on f, which are slight modiﬁcations of Arrow’s own conditions in Arrow [1].
The ﬁrst two conditions are well known, and require no further explanation.
Strong Pareto Principle (SP): For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, and for all R = (R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;
Rn) 2 Df, if (x;A)P(Ri)(y;B) holds for all i 2 N, then we have (x;A)P(R)(y;B),
and if (x;A)I(Ri)(y;B) holds for all i 2 N, then we have (x;A)I(R)(y;B), where
R = f(R).
Non-Dictatorship (ND): There exists no i 2 N that satisﬁes [(x;A)P(Ri)(y;B) )
(x;A)P(R)(y;B) for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω] holds for all R = (R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;Rn) 2 Df,
where R = f(R).
There are various ways of formulating Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alterna-
tives in our present context. Consider the following:












i(y;fyg)] holds for all i 2 N,
then [(x;A)R1(y;B) , (x;A)R2(y;B)] holds, where R1 = f(R1) and R2 = f(R2).







n) 2 Df, and for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω with #A =
#B, if [(x;A)R1
i(y;B) , (x;A)R2
i(y;B)] holds for all i 2 N, then [(x;A)R1(y;B) ,
(x;A)R2(y;B)] holds, where R1 = f(R1) and R2 = f(R2).







n) 2 Df, and for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, if [(x;A)R1
i(y;B)
, (x;A)R2
i(y;B)] holds for all i 2 N, then [(x;A)R1(y;B) , (x;A)R2(y;B)]
holds, where R1 = f(R1) and R2 = f(R2).
5It may be argued that the measurement of opportunity in terms of the cardinality of the opportunity
set is naive, and one should take such information as similarities among outcomes into consideration.
This can be done as in Pattanaik and Xu [13] using the minimum of the cardinalities of informationally
equivalent classes rather than the cardinality of the opportunity set per se. It is for the purpose of
keeping our framework as simple as possible that we are using in this chapter the cardinality approach
in measuring opportunity. See, however, Section 5 below.
6Recollect that we are neglecting decision-making cost and other factors that make a larger opportu-
nity set a liability rather than a credit. For some arguments which may cast reasonable doubts on the
universal worth of having a larger opportunity set rather than a smaller one, the interested readers are
referred to Dworkin [5].
56(IIA(i)) says that the extended social preference between any two extended alterna-
tives (x;A) and (y;B) depends on each individual’s extended preference between them
as well as each individual’s extended preference between (x;fxg) and (y;fyg). (IIA(ii)),
on the other hand, says that the extended social preference between any two extended
alternatives (x;A) and (y;B) with #A = #B depends on each individual’s extended pref-
erence between them. Finally, (FIIA) says that the extended social preference between
any two extended alternatives (x;A) and (y;B) depends on each individual’s extended
preference between them. It is clear that (IIA(i)) is logically independent of (IIA(ii)),
and both (IIA(i)) and (IIA(ii)) are logically weaker than (FIIA).
3 Arrovian Impossibility Theorems in the Conse-
quentialist Framework
In this section, we discuss Arrovian impossibility theorems in the framework which is
broader than welfarist-consequentialism, yet lies within consequentialism. Following
Suzumura and Xu [28], let us identify two types of an individual whom we have a reason
to call a consequentialist:
Extreme Consequentialist: An individual i 2 N is said to be an extreme consequen-
tialist if, for all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω, it is true that (x;A)I(Ri)(x;B).
Strong Consequentialist: An individual i is said to be a strong consequentialist if, for
all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω,
(a) if (x;fxg)I(Ri)(y;fyg), then #A ¸ #B , (x;A)Ri(y;B); and
(b) if (x;fxg)P(Ri)(y;fyg), then (x;A)P(Ri)(y;B).
Thus, an extreme consequentialist ranks two extended alternatives (x;A) and (y;B)
simply in terms of their outcomes x and y, giving no relevance to the opportunity sets A
and B from which x and y are chosen. In contrast, a strong consequentialist ranks two
alternatives (x;A) and (y;B) in complete accordance with their outcomes x and y only
if he has a strict preference between choosing x from the singleton set fxg, and choosing
y from the singleton set fyg. If he is indiﬀerent between choosing x from the singleton
set fxg, and choosing y from the singleton set fyg, his preference ranking between (x;A)
and (y;B) is in accordance with the cardinality comparison between A and B. It is to
this limited extent that a strong consequentialist reveals his preference for opportunity,
thereby exhibiting his impure consequentialist side of attitude.
As the following lemma shows, for an extreme as well as a strong consequential-
ist, imposing the conditions (IND), (SI) and (MON) does not in fact restrict his/her
preferences at all.
Lemma 2. An extreme as well as a strong consequentialist’s extended preference order-
ings must always satisfy the three conditions (IND), (SI) and (MON).
Proof. It is easy to check that both an extreme and a strong consequentialist’s extended
57preference orderings satisfy (SI) and (MON). We now prove that (IND) is satisﬁed by
an extreme and a strong consequentialist’s extended preference orderings.
An Extreme Consequentialist: Let i be an extreme consequentialist and Ri be his
extended preference ordering. Let (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω and z 2 X n (A [ B) be such
that (x;A)Ri(y;B) holds. By deﬁnition of an extreme consequentialist, we must have
(x;A)I(Ri)(x;A [ fzg) and (y;B)I(Ri)(y;B [ fzg). Then transitivity of Ri implies
(x;A[fzg)Ri(y;B[fzg). The converse implication may be similarly veriﬁed. Therefore,
(IND) holds for an extreme consequentialist’s extended preference orderings.
A Strong Consequentialist: Let j be a strong consequentialist and Rj be his ex-
tended preference ordering. Let (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω and z 2 X n (A [ B) be such that
(x;A)Rj(y;B) holds. We distinguish three cases that exhaust all possibilities, viz. (a)
(x;A)I(Rj)(y;B); (b) x = y and (x;A)P(Rj)(y;B); (c) x 6= y and (x;A)P(Rj)(y;B).
In case (a), according to the deﬁnition of a strong consequentilist, it must be that
(x;fxg)I(Rj)(y;fyg) and #A = #B. Then, by the deﬁnition of strong consequen-
tialism, it follows that (x;A [ fzg)I(Rj)(y;B [ fzg). In case (b), since x = y, by the
deﬁnition of a strong consequentialist, we must have #A > #B. Clearly, #(A [ fzg) >
#(B [ fzg). Hence, (x;A [ fzg)P(Rj)(y;B [ fzg) follows from the deﬁnition of strong
consequentialism. Finally, in case (c), we must have that (x;fxg)P(Rj)(y;fyg). Then,
(x;A [ fzg)P(Rj)(y;B [ fzg) follows immediately from the deﬁnition of a strong con-
sequentialist. The converse may be similarly veriﬁed. Hence, a strong consequentialist’s
extended preference orderings satisfy (IND).
Let us now introduce three domain restrictions on f by specifying some appropriate
subsets of Df. In the ﬁrst place, let Df(E) be the set of all proﬁles in Df such that
all individuals are extreme consequentialists. In the second place, let Df(E [ S) be the
set of all proﬁles in Df such that at least one individual is an extreme consequentialist
uniformly for all proﬁles R = (R1;¢¢¢ ;Rn) 2 Df and at least one individual is a strong
consequentialist uniformly for all proﬁles R = (R1;¢¢¢ ;Rn) 2 Df. Finally, let Df(S) be
the set of all proﬁles in Df such that all individuals are strong consequentialists.
We are now ready to present our results, beginning with the consequentialist frame-
work. The ﬁrst result is a simple restatement of Arrow’s general impossibility theorem
save for the restriction on the domain of the extended social welfare function and a slight
strengthening of the Pareto principle.
Theorem 1. Suppose that all individuals are extreme consequentialists. Then, there
exists no extended social welfare function f with the domain Df(E) which satisﬁes (SP),
(ND) and either (IIA(i)) or (IIA(ii)).
Proof. Suppose that there exists an ESWF f on Df(E) which satisﬁes (SP) as well as
(IIA(i)). Since all individuals are extreme consequentialists,
8i 2 N : (x;A)Ri(y;B) , (x;X)Ri(y;X) (3.1)
58holds for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω and for all R = (R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;Rn) 2 Df(E). Note that
the conditions (IND), (SI) and (SM) impose no restriction whatsoever on the proﬁle
R = (R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;Rn) even when, for each and every i 2 N;Ri is restricted on ΩX :=
f(x;X) 2 X £ Kjx 2 Xg. Note also that (SP) and (IIA(i)) imposed on f imply
that the same conditions must be satisﬁed on the restricted space ΩX. By virtue of
the Arrow impossibility theorem, therefore, there exists a dictator, say d 2 N, for f
on the restricted space ΩX. That is, for all R = (R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;Rn) 2 Df(E) and all
(x;X);(y;X) 2 ΩX, (x;X)P(Rd)(y;X) ) (x;X)P(R)(y;X), where R = f(R). We now
show that for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, (x;A)P(Rd)(y;B) ) (x;A)P(R)(y;B), viz., d is a
dictator for f on the full space Ω. Note that, since d is an extreme consequentialist,
we must have that (x;A)P(Rd)(y;B) iﬀ (x;X)P(Rd)(y;X). Since all individuals are
extreme consequentialists, it must be true that (x;A)I(Ri)(x;X) and (y;B)I(Ri)(y;X)
for all i 2 N. Therefore, by (SP), (x;A)I(R)(x;X) and (y;B)I(R)(y;X). By virtue of
the transitivity of R, it follows that (x;X)P(R)(y;X) ) (x;A)P(R)(y;B). That is, we
have shown that (x;A)P(Rd)(y;B) ) (x;A)P(R)(y;B): In other words, d is a dictator
for f on the full space Ω. Therefore, there exists no ESWF that satisﬁes (SP), (IIA(i))
and (ND).
A similar argument as above can be used to show that there exists no ESWF that
satisﬁes (SP), (IIA(ii)) and (ND).
Thus, the similarity of attitudes among individuals in the sense that all individuals
are extreme consequentialists brings back an essentially Arrovian impossibility result.
The message of this theorem can be strengthened by proving the next theorem which
asserts that the impossibility result disappears if an extreme consequentialist and a strong
consequentialist coexist in the society.
Theorem 2. Suppose that there exist at least one uniform extreme-consequentialist over
Df(E[S) and at least one uniform strong-consequentialist over Df(E[S) in the society.7
Then, there exists an extended social welfare function f with the domain Df(E[S) which
satisﬁes (SP), (IIA(i)),(IIA(ii)) and ND.
Proof. Let e 2 N be a uniform extreme-consequentialist and s 2 N be a uniform
strong-consequentialist. By deﬁnition,
8(x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω : (x;A)I(Re)(x;B); (3.2)
8(x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω : (x;fxg)I(Rs)(y;fyg) ) [(x;A)Rs(y;B) , #A ¸ #B] (3.3)
and
8(x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω : (x;fxg)P(Rs)(y;fyg) ) (x;A)P(Rs)(y;B) (3.4)
hold. Now consider the following ESWF:
7A uniform extreme-consequentialist over Df(E [ S) is a person who is an extreme-consequentialist
uniformly for all proﬁles in Df(E [ S). The deﬁnition of a uniform strong-consequentialist is similar.
598(x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω:
(x;fxg)P(Rs)(y;fyg) ) [(x;A)R(y;B) , (x;A)Rs(y;B)];
(x;fxg)I(Rs)(y;fyg) ) [(x;A)R(y;B) , (x;A)Re(y;B)],
where R = f(R).
It may easily be veriﬁed that the above ESWF satisﬁes (SP) and (ND). To verify
that it satisﬁes both (IIA(i)) and (IIA(ii)), we consider (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, and R =
(R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;Rn);R0 = (R0
1;R0
2;¢¢¢ ;R0
n) 2 Df(E [ S). Let R = f(R) and R0 = f(R0).
To begin with, suppose that we have (x;A)Ri(y;B) , (x;A)R0
i(y;B) as well as
(x;fxg)Ri(y;fyg) , (x;fxg)R0
i(y;fyg) for all i 2 N. If (x;fxg)P(Rs)(y;fyg), then
(x;fxg)P(R0
s)(y;fyg), (x;A)P(Rs)(y;B), as well as (x;A)P(R0
s)(y;B). Then, the ESWF
gives us (x;A)P(R)(y;B) and (x;A)P(R0)(y;B). Secondly, if (y;fyg)P(Rs)(x;
fxg), then (y;fyg)P(R0
s)(x;fxg), (y;B)P(Rs)(x;A), and (y;B)P(R0
s)(x;A). Then, the
ESWF gives us (y;B)P(R)(x;A) and (y;B)P(R0)(x;A). Thirdly, if (x;fxg)I(Rs)
(y;fyg), then (x;fxg)I(R0
s)(y;fyg). The ESWF implies that (x;A)R(y;B) , (x;A)Re
(y;B) and (x;A)R0(y;B) , (x;A)R0
e(y;B). Note that individual e is an extreme con-
sequentialist. It is therefore clear that, in this case, if (x;A)Re(y;B) , (x;A)R0
e(y;B),
then (x;A)R(y;B) , (x;A)R0(y;B). Therefore, (IIA(i)) is satisﬁed.
Next, suppose that #A = #B and that [(x;A)Ri(y;B) , (x;A)R0
i(y;B)] for all
i 2 N. To show that (x;A)R(y;B) , (x;A)R0(y;B) in this case, we observe that, when
#A = #B, (x;A)Rs(y;B) , (x;fxg)Rs(y;fyg) and (x;A)R0
s(y;B) , (x;fxg)R0
s(y;fyg).
Then the proof that the above ESWF satisﬁes (IIA(ii)) is similar to the proof showing
that the ESWF satisﬁes (IIA(i)). We have only to note that the individual e is an
extreme consequentialist.
The binary relation R generated by this ESWF is clearly reﬂexive and complete. We
now show that R is transitive. Let (x;A);(y;B) and (z;C) 2 Ω be such that (x;A)R(y;B)
and (y;B)R(z;C). Note that, since (x;A)R(y;B), by the ESWF constructed above, we
cannot have (y;fyg)P(Rs)(x;fxg). Then, by the completeness of Rs, there are only two
cases to be distinguished and separately considered: (a) (x;fxg)I(Rs)(y;fyg); and (b)
(x;fxg)P(Rs)(y;fyg).
Case (a): In this case, we must have (x;A)Re(y;B). If (y;fyg)I(Rs)(z;fzg), then
it follows from (y;B)R(z;C) that (y;B)Re(z;C). Then, the transitivity of Re implies
(x;A)Re(z;C). By the transitivity of Rs, (x;fxg)I(Rs)(z;fzg). Therefore, (x;A)R(z;C)
if and only if (x;A)Re(z;C). Hence, (x;A)R(z;C) follows from (x;A)Re(z;C). If
(y;fyg)P(Rs)(z;fzg), then, by the transitivity of Rs, it follows that (x;fxg)P(Rs)(z;fzg).
Therefore, (x;A)R(z;C) if and only if (x;A)Rs(z;C). Since s is a strong consequen-
tialist, given that (x;fxg)P(Rs)(z;fzg), we must have (x;A)P(Rs)(z;C). Therefore,
(x;A)P(R)(z;C). Hence, (x;A)R(z;C) holds. Note that, given (y;B)R(z;C), we can-
not have (z;fzg)P(Rs)(y;fyg). Therefore, the transitivity of R holds in the case (a).
Case (b): In this case, we must have (x;A)P(Rs)(y;B), hence (x;A)P(R)(y;B).
Since (y;B)R(z;C), we must then have (y;fyg)Rs(z;fzg). By the transitivity of Rs, it
follows that (x;fxg)P(Rs)(z;fzg). Thus, (x;A)P(Rs)(z;C) follows from s being a strong
60consequentialist. By construction, in this case, (x;A)R(z;C) if and only if (x;A)Rs(z;C).
Hence, (x;A)P(R)(z;C). Therefore, the transitivity of R holds in the case (b).
Combining the cases (a) and (b), the transitivity of R is proved.
How about the society consisting only of strong consequentialists? Consistent with
Theorem 1 as well as Theorem 2, we may assert the following:
Theorem 3. Suppose that all individuals are strong consequentialists. Then, there
exists no extended social welfare function f with the domain Df(S) which satisﬁes (SP),
(IIA) and (ND).
Proof. Since all individuals are strong consequentialists, we have the following for all i 2
N: For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, if (x;fxg)I(Ri)(y;fyg), then #A ¸ #B , (x;A)Ri(y;B),
whereas if (x;fxg)P(Ri)(y;fyg), then (x;A)Ri(y;B) , (x;X)Ri(y;X). Suppose that an
ESWF f satisﬁes (SP) and (FIIA), and consider all triples (x;A);(y;B) and (z;C) 2 Ω
such that x;y and z are all distinct. Since all individuals are strong consequentialists and
f has the domain Df(S), there exists no restriction on each individual’s strict extended
preference orderings over f(x;A);(y;B);(z;C)g. Thus, there is a dictator over the triple
f(x;A);(y;B);(z;C)g. Note that the triple f(x;A);(y;B);(z;C)g, where A 6= X, co-
incides with the triple f(x;X);(y;B);(z;C)g over the pair f(y;B);(z;C)g. Hence the
dictator over the triple f(x;A);(y;B);(z;C)g must in fact be independent of the set
A 2 K. The same argument can be applied to B 2 K as well as C 2 K. Hence, for all
triples f(x;A);(y;B);(z;C)g, we must have a single dictator. Call him d 2 N and con-
sider a triple (x;A);(y;B) and (z;C) 2 Ω such that x;y and z are all distinct. Consider
any (x;A¤) 2 Ω, where A 6= A¤. If A¤ ½ A, all individuals being strong consequential-
ists, (SP) implies that (x;A)P(R)(x;A¤), where R = f(R). Similarly, if A ½ A¤, all
individuals being strong consequentialists, (SP) implies that (x;A¤)P(R)(x;A), where
R = f(R). If neither A is a subset of A¤, nor A¤ is a subset of A, all individuals being
strong consequentialists, we must have (x;A)Ri(x;A¤) iﬀ #A ¸ #A¤. Then, (SP) im-
plies that (x;A)R(x;A¤) iﬀ #A ¸ #A¤, where R = f(R). Hence, d is a dictator over Ω.
Therefore, there exists no ESWF satisfying (SP), (FIIA) and (ND).
The message of these simple results seems very clear. Within the consequentialist
framework, if all individuals are either extreme consequentialists or strong consequential-
ists, we have essentially Arrovian impossibility results. As the society becomes diverse
by having at least one uniform extreme consequentialist and at least one uniform strong
consequentialist simultaneously, however, it is possible to design an extended social wel-
fare function that satisﬁes a variant of the Arrow conditions. Thus, it is the diversity of
the society, or the heterogeneity of population in the society, that plays a crucial role in
resolving the Arrow impossibility theorem within the consequentialist framework.
614 Arrovian Impossibility Theorem in the
Non-Consequentialist Framework
Let us now turn to the examination of Arrow’s impossibility theorem in a non-consequen-
tialist framework. Our ﬁrst task is to clarify what precisely we mean by non-consequen-
tialism. Following Suzumura and Xu [28], let us deﬁne an individual to be a non-
consequentialist as follows:8
Non-Consequentialist: An individual i 2 N is said to be a non-consequentialist if,
for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, (a) #A > #B ) (x;A)P(Ri)(y;B); and (b) #A = #B )
[(x;A)Ri(y;B) , (x;fxg)Ri(y;fyg)].
Thus, a non-consequentialist is a person whose preference ranking over two extended
alternatives (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω are such that, whenever the opportunity set A contains
more alternatives than the opportunity set B, (x;A) is ranked higher than (y;B). It is
only when A and B contain the same number of alternatives that (x;A) and (y;B) are
ranked exactly the same as (x;fxg) and (y;fyg). In this sense, a non-consequentialist is
in sharp contrast with both an extreme consequentialist and a strong consequentialist.
The following lemma shows that, for a non-consequentialist, imposing the condi-
tions (IND), (SI) and (MON) introduced in Section 2 does not in fact restrict his/her
preferences at all.
Lemma 3. A non-consequentialist’s extended preference orderings must satisfy the three
conditions (IND), (SI) and (MON).
Proof. It can be checked easily that a non-consequentialist’s extended preference or-
derings satisfy (SI) and (MON). We now show that (IND) is also satisﬁed by a non-
consequentialist’s extended preference orderings.
Let i be a non-consequentialist. Let (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω and z 2 X n A [ B. Suppose
(x;A)Ri(y;B). There are two cases to consider: (a) #A > #B and (b) #A = #B.
In case (a), clearly, (x;A)P(Ri)(y;B) and #(A [ fzg) > #(B [ fzg). Hence, (x;A [
fzg)P(Ri)(y;B [ fzg) follows from i being a non-consequentialist. In case (b), we have
(x;A)Ri(y;B) if and only if (x;fxg)Ri(y;fyg) and #(A [ fzg) = #(B [ fzg). Then,
(x;A [ fzg)Ri(y;B [ fzg) if and only if (x;fxg)Ri(y;fyg) follows from i being a non-
consequentialist. Noting that Ri is complete, (IND) is therefore satisﬁed by Ri.
Let Df(N) be the domain of an extended social welfare function f such that there
exists at least one person, say n¤ 2 N, who is a non-consequentialist uniformly for all
proﬁles R = (R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;Rn) 2 Df(N). Such a person will be called a uniform non-
consequentialist over Df(N).
8In the terminology coined by Suzumura and Xu [28], a non-consequentialist deﬁned here is called a
strong non-consequentialist. Since this is the only category of non-consequentialism which is relevant in
the present chapter, we have simpliﬁed our circumlocution by avoinding the adjective “strong”.
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consequentialist over Df(N). Then, there exists an extended social welfare function f
with the domain Df(N) that satisﬁes (SP), (FIIA) and (ND).
Proof. Let n¤ 2 N be a uniform non-consequentialist over Df(N). Then, for all R =
(R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;Rn) 2 Df(N) and all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω, #A > #B implies (x;A)P(Rn¤)(y;B).
Consider now the following ESWF f: For all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω,
if #A > #B, then (x;A)P(R)(y;B);
if #A = #B = 1, then (x;fxg)R(y;fyg) iﬀ (x;fxg)R1(y;fyg);
if #A = #B = 2, then (x;A)R(y;B) iﬀ (x;A)R2(y;B);
. . .
if A = B = X, then (x;A)R(y;A) iﬀ (x;A)Rk(y;B), where k = minf#N;#Xg,
where R = f(R). It is easy to verify that this f satisﬁes SP, IIA and ND.9 It is also
clear that R generated by this ESWF is reﬂexive and complete. We now show that
R is transitive as well. Let (x;A);(y;B);(z;C) 2 Ω be such that (x;A)R(y;B) and
(y;B)R(z;C). Then, clearly, #A ¸ #B and #B ¸ #C. If #A > #B or #B > #C,
then #A > #C. By the constructed ESWF, (x;A)P(R)(z;C) follows easily. Thus,
the transitivity of R holds for this case. Now, suppose #A = #B = #C. Note that
in this case, for all (a;G);(b;H) 2 Ω such that #G = #H = #A, (a;G)R(b;H) iﬀ
(a;G)Rk(b;H) where k 2 N and k = minf#N;#Ag. Therefore, the transitivity of R
follows from the transitivity of Rk. The above two cases exhaust all the possibilities.
Therefore, R is transitive.
It is worthwhile to emphasize that, unlike the extreme consequentialist or the strong
consequentialist, a non-consequentialist is able to guarantee the existence of an Arrovian
extended social welfare function by oneself, and his ability is not nulliﬁed even in the
homogeneous society where all individuals are non-consequentialists.
9It may be worthwhile to note that the extended social welfare function constructed in this proof has
some nice features. When #X + 1 ¸ n, every individual can dictate one “layer” of the extended social
alternatives. Indeed, we assign the non-consequentialist to dictate over (x;A) and (y;B) in Ω such that
#A 6= #B. For each of all other individuals, we assign him to dictate over (x;A) and (y;B) in Ω such
that #A = #B coincides with his “index”. When #X + 1 < n, the number of “layers” is less than
suﬃcient to assign each individual a “layer” for him to dictate. In this case, however, we can divide the
population into two groups, Group 1 and Group 2. Group 2, which consists of (#X + 1) individuals
including the non-consequentialist, will dictate over speciﬁc extended social alternatives assigned to him.
The remainder of individuals form Group 1, which consists of (n ¡ #X ¡ 1) individuals, decide which
individual in Group 2 should dictate which “layer” of alternatives, allowing the non-consequentialist to
dictate over (x;A) and (y;B) with #A 6= #B. In this fashion, all individuals are assigned to actively
participate in the process of social decision-making.
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Although our analysis so far invoked the simple cardinality measure of the richness of
opportunities, which is often criticized for its naivety, some of our results can go far
beyond this special measure. To see this, let Θ be a complete orderings over K such
that, for all A;B 2 K;AΘB holds if and only if A contains no less opportunity than
B. P(Θ) and I(Θ) stand, respectively, for the asymmetric part and the symmetric part
of Θ. The set X of all conventionally deﬁned social states can be partitioned by I(Θ).
Let KΘ denote the family of equivalence classes in accordance with Θ. For each A 2 K,
let EΘ(A) 2 KΘ be the equivalence class determined by A. We can then deﬁne a linear
ordering Θ¤ on KΘ by
For all EΘ(A);EΘ(B) 2 KΘ;EΘ(A)Θ
¤EΘ(B) , AΘB: (5.1)
In what follows, we assume that (Θ;KΘ) satisﬁes the following two basic requirements:
Assumption U: The richness measure of opportunities, Θ, is unanimously held by all
individuals in the society.
Assumption R: There exist at least two equivalence classes in KΘ.
The deﬁnitions of consequentialists and non-consequentialists now read as follows:
Extreme Consequentialist: An individual i 2 N is said to be an extreme consequen-
tialist if, for all (x;A);(x;B) 2 Ω, it is true that (x;A)I(Ri)(x;B).
Strong Consequentialist: An individual i 2 N is said to be a strong consequentialist
if, for all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω,
(a) if (x;fxg)I(Ri)(y;fyg), then AΘB , (x;A)Ri(y;B); and
(b) if (x;fxg)P(Ri)(y;fyg), then (x;A)P(Ri)(y;B).
Non-Consequentialist: An individual i 2 N is said to be a non-consequentialist if, for
all (x;A);(y;B) 2 Ω,
(a) AP(Θ)B ) (x;A)P(Ri)(y;B); and
(b) AI(Θ)B ) [(x;A)Ri(y;B) , (x;fxg)Ri(y;fyg)].
We can now generalize our results in Sections 3 and 4 for the framework discussed in
this section as follows. The proofs of these results are similar to those of Theorems 1, 2,
3 and 4, and we may safely omit them.
Theorem 5. Suppose that all individuals are extreme consequentialists. Then, there
exists no extended social welfare function f with the domain Df(E) which satisﬁes (SP),
(ND) and either (IIA(i)) or (IIA(ii)).
Theorem 6. Suppose that there exists at least one person who is a uniform extreme-
consequentialist over Df(E [ S) and at least one person who is a uniform strong-
64consequentialist over Df(E [ S) in the society. Then, there exists an extended social
welfare function f with the domain Df(E [ S) which satisﬁes (SP), (IIA(i)), (IIA(ii))
and (ND).
Theorem 7. Suppose that all individuals are strong consequentialists. Then, there
exists no extended social welfare function f with the domain Df(S) which satisﬁes (SP),
(FIIA) and (ND).
Theorem 8. Suppose that there exists at least one person who is a uniform non-
consequentialist over Df(N). Then, there exists an extended social welfare function f
with the domain Df(N) which satisﬁes (SP), IIA and (ND).
Thus, our basic results in this chapter do not in fact hinge on somewhat controversial
cardinality measure of the richness of opportunities.
6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter developed two extended analytical frameworks of social choice theory in
order to check how and to what extent Arrow’s general impossibility theorem hinges on his
basic assumption of welfarist-consequentialism. Another motivation of our analysis was
to see whether or not Arrow’s observation that “the possibility of social welfare judgments
rests upon a similarity of attitudes toward social alternatives” could be substantiated in
the arena which is wider than welfarist-consequentialism.
The starting point of our analysis was an extended individual preference ordering
deﬁned over the pairs of social states and opportunity sets to which these social states
belong.10 It seems to us that people are prepared to say that choosing an alternative
x from an opportunity set A is at least as good as choosing an alternative y from an
opportunity set B. Negating the possibility of expressing such an extended preference
ordering altogether is tantamount to saying that there is no intrinsic value in the act
of choice as such, since we are then not in the position to say that choosing x from A,
which includes x among others, is better than choosing x from fxg, which in fact means
no eﬀective choice at all. The concept of extended preference orderings enabled us to
formulate a wider conceptual framework for analyzing social choice, and we could iden-
tify two such frameworks: the consequentialist framework and the non-consequentialist
framework. The former is concerned with a society in which at least one consequentialist,
either extreme or strong, exists, whereas the latter is concerned with a society in which
at least one non-consequentialist exists.
10As far as we are aware, Gravel [6; 7] was the ﬁrst who analyzed the concept of extended preference
orderings. However, he assumed the existence of two individual preference orderings, viz. the preference
ordering r on the set of options X, on the one hand, and the extended preference ordering R on the
Cartesian product of X and K, where K is the set of opportunity sets from which the individual
chooses. His analysis was focussed on the possible conﬂict between these preference orderings, and no
role whatsoever is played in his analysis by the concept of consequentialism and non-consequentialism.
See also Sen [21] for an implicit approach of using extended preference orderings in social choice theory.
65Within the consequentialist framework, it was shown that the Arrovian impossibility
theorem strenuously comes back if all individuals are either extreme consequentialists
or strong consequentialists, whereas a more diverse society resided simultaneously by at
least one extreme consequentialist and at least one strong consequentialist admits the
existence of an Arrovian extended social welfare function. In this sense, it is the diversity
rather than similarity of individual attitudes towards social alternatives in the society
that contributes to resolve the Arrow impossibility theorem within the consequentialist
framework. The logical fate of the non-consequentialist society is rather diﬀerent. Indeed,
within the non-consequentialist framework, it was possible to guarantee the existence of
an Arrovian extended social welfare function as long as there exists at least one non-
consequentialist in the society, and this ability is not nulliﬁed even if the society is
homogeneous so that all individuals are non-consequentialists. Although these results
are ﬁrst established by using a naive cardinality measure of the richness of opportunities,
their validity does not hinge on this arguably controversial measure.
It is hoped that our results, though simple, would be suggestive enough to motivate
further exploration of the wider conceptual frameworks of social choice theory.
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